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This paper uses the Human Smugglers Act as a case study of what can happen when a 
Canadian government tables legislation that is highly controversial not only for reasons of 
ideology or policy, but also because it almost certainly violates the Charter. The conclusion 
is twofold: first, that a requirement originally meant to increase government accountability 
in the face of Canada’s human rights instruments is failing; and second, that this same 
requirement is now providing the government political cover to deflect legitimate consti-
tutional critique while simultaneously avoiding substantive engagement. The result is an 
impoverished constitutional dialogue and a misled Canadian public.
Cet article fait de la « Loi visant à empêcher les passeurs d’utiliser abusivement le système 
d’immigration canadien » une étude de cas pour comprendre ce qui pourrait se passer 
lorsque le gouvernement canadien dépose une loi très controversée, non seulement pour 
des raisons d’idéologie ou de politique, mais encore parce qu’elle contrevient sans doute 
à la Charte. Il arrive à une double conclusion : d’abord, qu’une exigence devant à l’origine 
accroître la responsabilisation du gouvernement face aux instruments des droits de la 
personne au Canada échoue, et ensuite que cette même exigence procure désormais au 
gouvernement un bouclier politique le protégeant contre une légitime critique constitution-
nelle tout en lui permettant d’éviter de se mouiller les pieds. Il en résulte un dialogue consti-
tutionnel appauvri qui induit en erreur le public canadien.
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WHEN THE PREVENTING HUMAN Smugglers from Abusing Canada’s Immigration 
System Act [Human Smugglers Act]1 was introduced as Bill C-49 in October 
2010, it was more than simply its idiosyncratic title that generated attention. 
Almost immediately, opposition parties, refugee advocates, legal organizations, 
and academics forcefully criticized the government’s proposal. Many declared 
that the new bill was punitive and regressive, arguing that it contained measures that 
were not only fundamentally unfair, but also in violation of a variety of international 
instruments.2 They further claimed that the proposed law represented an egregious 
and self-evident contravention of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms.3 The 
government, meanwhile, maintained that Bill C-49 was a key component of its 
1. Bill C-49, An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee 
Reform Act and the Marine Transportation Security Act, 3rd Sess, 40th Parl, 2010 [Bill C-49]. 
2. See e.g. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150, Can TS 
1969 No 6; Convention on the rights of the child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, Can 
TS 1992 No 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171, Can TS 1976 No 47.
3. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. For critiques based on legal grounds, 
see e.g. Canadian Council for Refugees, “Bill C-4: Key concerns” (21 June 2011), online: 
<http://ccrweb.ca> [CCR, “Bill C-4”]; Canadian Bar Association, “Bill C-49, Preventing 
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strategy for combating fraudulent refugee claims and human smuggling—a refrain 
it repeated in both June 2011 when the Human Smugglers Act was re-introduced 
to a newly elected House of Commons as Bill C-4,4 and in March 2012, when 
the contents of the Human Smugglers Act were rolled into Bill C-31, an omnibus 
refugee bill.5 When asked to respond to allegations that the government was 
deliberately promoting unconstitutional legislation, senior parliamentarians 
stated unequivocally that the proposed laws were Charter compliant. 
This paper uses the introduction of the Human Smugglers Act as a case study 
with which to explore what can happen when a Canadian government tables 
legislation that is highly controversial not only for reasons of ideology or policy, 
but also because it is almost certainly in violation of the Charter. My ultimate 
conclusion is twofold: first, that a requirement originally meant to increase 
government accountability in the face of Canada’s human rights instruments is 
failing; and second, that this same requirement is now providing “political cover” 
in situations where the government seeks to deflect legitimate constitutional 
critique while simultaneously avoiding substantive engagement. The result, 
I argue, is a democratic deficit comprised of an impoverished constitutional 
dialogue and a misled Canadian public. 
The discussion proceeds in three sections: Part I describes the govern-
ment’s duty to vet new legislation for inconsistencies with certain human rights 
commitments and explains the threshold for determining when a report on 
Human Smugglers from Abusing Canada’s Immigration System Act” (November 2010), online: 
<http://www.cba.org/cba/submissions/pdf/10-78-eng.pdf>.
4. There was a Canadian federal election in May 2011 and as a result, Bill C-49 died on the 
order paper. The newly formed majority government re-introduced the provisions as Bill C-4 
in June 2011. See An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced 
Refugee Reform Act and the Marine Transportation Security Act, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2011 [Bill 
C-4]. The text of Bill C-49 and C-4 are essentially identical—with only two small differences 
between them. Both of these are insignificant for the purposes of this paper. See e.g. House 
of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 10 (16 June 2011) at 1155 (Hon Jason Kenney) 
(demonstrating that Bill C-4 was a key component of government strategy). 
5. The Human Smugglers Act was incorporated into Bill C-31, An Act to amend the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee Reform Act, the Marine Transportation Security 
Act and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2012 [Bill 
C-31]. Bill C-31 is now in force. See Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, SC 2012, 
c 17. A note about terminology: Since my focus is exclusively on the portions of Bill C-31 
that were previously contained in the Human Smugglers Act, I will use that title to refer to 
the relevant provisions. In addition, as this paper addresses the review requirements for bills, 
my analysis focuses on the Human Smugglers Act as it was introduced in Bills C-49, C-4, and 
C-31. Details of the relevant provisions are explained in more detail below. 
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Charter compliance must be issued to the House of Commons. Part II identifies 
key components of the Human Smugglers Act, and demonstrates that it contains 
blatant constitutional deficiencies that ought to have triggered a report of 
non-compliance in accordance with the standard described in Part I. That it 
did not suggests that the reporting requirement is failing as an accountability 
mechanism. Part III identifies the ways the government is using its legal duty 
to vet for Charter compliance to evade meaningful constitutional inquiry. This 
Part argues that the reporting requirement may be contributing to the erosion of 
substantive public debate on the constitutional status of new legislation, thereby 
creating a significant democratic deficit. The final section, Part IV, concludes 
that the Human Smugglers Act is not an isolated example and calls for Canada’s 
reporting requirement to be re-visited. 
I.  CHARTER-VETTING AND THE “INESCAPABLE” NEED TO  
REPORT A LACK OF COMPLIANCE
Section 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act mandates that every government bill 
be reviewed by the Minister of Justice to ascertain “whether any of the provisions 
thereof are inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms.”6 The minister is also required to report any inconsisten-
cies to the House of Commons.7 Regulations corresponding to the provision 
specify that every government bill that is not the subject of a report must be 
filed with a certificate acknowledging that the section 4.1 vetting process has 
occurred.8 The Human Smugglers Act is no exception, and both the Clerk of the 
House of Commons and the Clerk of the Privy Council have certified copies of 
Bills C-49, 4, and 31 bearing the following text: “Examined as required by the 
6. RSC 1985, c J-2, s 4.1.
7. Ibid.
8. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Examination Regulations, SOR/85-781, s 3. It 
reads as follows: 
In the case of every Bill introduced in or presented to the House of Commons by a Minister 
of the Crown, the Minister shall, forthwith on receipt of two copies of the Bill from the Clerk 
of the House of Commons, (a) examine the Bill in order to determine whether any of the 
provisions thereof are inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, and (b) cause to be affixed to each of the copies thereof so received 
from the Clerk of the House of Commons a certificate, in a form approved by the Minister and 
signed by the Deputy Minister of Justice, stating that the Bill has been examined as required 
by section 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act, and one each of the copies thereof so certified 
shall thereupon be transmitted to the Clerk of the House of Commons and the Clerk of the 
Privy Council.
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Canadian Bill of Rights and the Department of Justice Act.” The stamp is signed on 
behalf of the Deputy Minister of Justice.9 
The following paragraphs briefly explore the section 4.1 reporting 
requirement. Although this section does not purport to be a comprehensive study, 
it does provide important context for the discussion in the remainder of this paper.
A. ORIGINS OF THE NEED TO REPORT
Section 4.1 was added to the Department of Justice Act in 1985 as part of 
series of statutory amendments relating to the introduction of the Charter.10 
The provision mirrors section 3 of the Canadian Bill of Rights, which requires 
a similar examination to ensure compliance with the provisions of that 
instrument.11 A brief look at the history of section 3 sheds some light on 
the purpose of these requirements. The Special Committee on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms added the reporting requirement to the draft Bill of 
Rights after noting that, as first drafted, the duty to examine proposed legislation 
to ensure consistency with the new rights framework was not accompanied by 
any “concurrent obligation [on the minister responsible for the examination] to 
bring his views by way of report before the House of Commons.”12 
Minister of Justice Edmund Davie Fulton stated that he fully supported 
a statutorily imposed “specific obligation of reporting” since he viewed this as 
an “inescapable and necessary implication” of the requirement to examine bills 
for compliance.13 Opposition members of the committee also supported the 
amendment, finding that the guarantee of reports was a “welcome advance” in 
the effort to ensure the protection of human rights.14 The House of Commons 
agreed, and the amended section was accepted and introduced with the remainder 
of the Bill of Rights in 1960. 
9. Certified copies of Bills C-4, 49, and 31 were obtained by the author through an Access to 
Information Request. Bill C-49 was certified on 5 November 2010; Bill C-4 was certified on 
23 June 2011; and Bill C-31 was certified on 28 February 2012. 
10. Sections 4.1(1) and (2) were added to the Department of Justice Act as part of a bill that aimed 
to ensure that all Canadian legislation respected the Charter’s guarantees. See Statute Law 
(Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) Amendment Act, RSC 1985, c 31 (1st Supp), s 93.
11. SC 1960, c 44, s 3. 
12. House of Commons Debates, 24th Parl, 3rd Sess, Vol 7 (1 August 1960) at 7373 (Hon 
Edmund Davie Fulton).
13. Ibid.
14. House of Commons Debates, 24th Parl, 3rd Sess, Vol 7 (3 August 1960) at 7494 (Hon Paul 
Martin).
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Despite these initial impressions that the reporting requirement in section 
3 was an “inescapable” accountability mechanism, only one report of potential 
non-compliance with the Bill of Rights has ever been presented to the House 
of Commons. This occurred in 1975 and related to a Senate amendment to a 
government bill amending the Feeds Act.15 Further, there has never been a report 
under section 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act.16 This means that while over 
thirty years’ worth of government bills have been scrutinized for constitutional 
compliance, not one has been found to be inconsistent with the Charter through 
this vetting process.17 
B. NATURE OF THE VETTING PROCESS 
Although all government-proposed legislation must be vetted for inconsistency with 
the Charter, ordinary Canadians are unable to access the resulting legal analysis. 
Neither are most Members of Parliament (MPs). In fact, only high-ranking 
government officials (and some senior bureaucrats) are allowed to see either 
the Department of Justice’s legal opinions or obtain details about the process 
and standards applied to meet the section 4.1 requirements. Both are said to be 
protected by solicitor-client and cabinet privilege and are so shrouded in secrecy 
that they are also explicitly exempted from the scope of the Access to Information 
Act and the Canada Evidence Act.18 
15. RSC, 1985, c F-9. See Elmer Driedger, “The Meaning and Effect of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights: A Draftsman’s Viewpoint” (1977) 9:2 Ottawa L Rev 303 at 306. The report resulted 
from a government determination that the changes proposed by the Senate were inconsistent 
with the Bill of Rights on the basis that they conflicted with the presumption of innocence. 
16. Janet L Hiebert, “Rights-Vetting in New Zealand and Canada: Similar Idea, Different 
Outcomes” (2005) 3:1 NZJ Pub & Int’l L 63 at 65 [Hiebert, “Rights-Vetting”]; Grant 
Huscroft, “Reconciling Duty and Discretion: The Attorney in the Charter Era” (2009) 34:2 
Queen’s LJ 773 at 793, n 57 [Huscroft, “Reconciling Duty”]. 
17. In contrast, New Zealand’s reporting requirement, which forms part of its Bill of Rights 
Act (1990), has produced fifty-nine reports, including twenty-eight relating to government 
bills. See Ministry of Justice, “Section 7 reports,” online: Ministry of Justice <http://www.
justice.govt.nz/policy/constitutional-law-and-human-rights/human-rights/domestic-human-
rights-protection/about-the-new-zealand-bill-of-rights-act/advising-the-attorney-general/
section-7-reports-published-before-august-2002/section-7-reports-published-before-
august-2002>. It should be noted that New Zealand’s reporting requirement is the main 
means by which legislation can be evaluated for compliance with the Bill of Rights, as this 
document does not have supremacy over other acts like the Charter does in Canada. See New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), 1990/109, s 4.
18. Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-1, s 69(1)(f )–(g); Canada Evidence Act, RSC 1985, 
c C-5, s 39. Certified copies of bills are however, available under the Access to Information Act 
and copies were obtained by the author by filing an Access to Information Request. See supra 
note 9. 
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Despite the closed nature of the section 4.1 process, some insights into the 
operationalization of the vetting and reporting requirements can be gleaned 
through public statements by current and former bureaucrats. In 1977, a former 
Deputy Minister of Justice and Deputy Attorney General of Canada described 
an iterative legislative process that included multiple opportunities for public 
servants to alert the Minister of Justice and Cabinet of any inconsistencies between 
proposed legislation and the Bill of Rights.19 An Associate Deputy Minister 
(Public Law) has since confirmed that this consultative structure continued 
after the introduction of the Charter. Mary Dawson’s account of the legislative 
process emphasizes early and frequent involvement by Charter experts housed in 
a specially created Human Rights Law Section of the Department of Justice.20 
The ultimate conclusion of both commentators is that because the drafting of 
new legislation provides ample opportunity for correction, governments are very 
unlikely to introduce a bill that obviously conflicts with one of Canada’s core 
human rights instruments.21 
These accounts have been enhanced by academic work on the subject: both 
James Kelly and Janet Hiebert have published details about implementation 
of the reporting requirement, obtained in part through anonymous interviews 
with former and current lawyers from the Department of Justice.22 Both confirm 
the important and ongoing role of lawyers in the Human Rights Law Section 
throughout the drafting process.
C. ASSESSING THE RISK OF NON-COMPLIANCE
Insiders are candid about the unique challenges facing lawyers who must 
determine whether proposed legislation is non-compliant, particularly with 
19. Driedger, supra note 15 at 303, 310-12.
20. Mary Dawson, “The Impact of the Charter on the Public Policy Process and the Department 
of Justice” (1992) 30:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 595 at 597-99. 
21. Driedger states that “the chances that a statute patently in conflict with the Bill of Rights 
could be enacted are virtually non-existent.” Driedger, supra note 15 at 311. Dawson reaches 
a similar conclusion, stating that the “legal adviser has a role in helping the [government] 
client understand the requirements of the Charter as it applies to a particular case” and 
noting that “[c]learly the Charter does foreclose certain options to governments.” Dawson, 
supra note 21 at 599.
22. James B Kelly, “Bureaucratic activism and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: the 
Department of Justice and its entry into the centre of government” (1999) 42:4 Can Pub 
Adm 476; Janet Hiebert, Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament’s Role? (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2002) [Hiebert, Charter Conflicts].
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respect to the justification analysis required under section 1 of the Charter.23 
Mary Dawson comments that it is frequently difficult to quantify the “degree of 
risk” that would compel a finding of non-compliance, noting that often the most 
difficult part of the process is characterizing the relevant Charter issues.24 Hiebert 
expands further on the nature of this risk assessment:
Justice lawyers have adopted an approach for reviewing bills based on a risk-assessment 
of the degree of difficulty in justifying legislation under the Charter. Risk-assessments 
are undertaken on a continuum from minimal, significant, substantial, and serious 
to unacceptable, the latter category representing a near-certainty that courts will 
invalidate the legislative action. 
At times, Justice officials have been asked to put their assessment into numerical terms: 
evaluating whether legislation has a 60 per cent chance of surviving as opposed to a 
lesser chance, or indicating whether the degree of risk likes on a scale of 1-10…while 
it can be difficult to distinguish between significant, substantial or serious risks 
assessments continue to be framed qualitatively.25 
Hiebert also explains that the ultimate threshold for determining whether 
a bill triggers a report on the basis of Charter inconsistency is “whether or not 
a credible Charter argument can be made.”26 Interestingly, this standard of “any 
credible argument” appears on its face to be different than the threshold described 
by Dawson, who refers to a search for “good arguments.”27 
In 2007, a senior government lawyer provided a more detailed description 
of the current threshold for establishing the existence of a Charter inconsis-
tency. Testifying before a Legislative Committee considering a criminal law 
bill,28 Stanley Cohen, Senior General Counsel with the Department of Justice’s 
Human Rights Law Section, was unusually candid about the process for vetting 
bills for inconsistency with the Charter. According to Cohen, a bill is deemed 
inconsistent with the Charter, and thus in need of a section 4.1 report, if the 
assessment concludes that it is “manifestly unconstitutional and could not be 
defended by credible arguments before a court.”29 Cohen explicitly distinguished 
23. Dawson, supra note 20 at 598-99. For more on section 1 analysis under the Canadian 
Charter, see “The inability to justify the prima facie Charter violations,” below. 
24. Ibid at 598.
25. Hiebert, Charter Conflicts, supra note 22 at 8. 
26. Ibid at 10. 
27. Dawson, supra note 20 at 598.
28. Bill C-2, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to other 
Acts, 2nd Sess, 39th Parl, 2007 (assented to 28 February 2008), SC 2008, c 6 [Bill C-2]. 
29. House of Commons, Legislative Committee on Bill C-2, 39th Parl, 2nd Sess, No 007 (15 
November 2007) at 1030 (Stanley Cohen). Note that there is some ambiguity about whether 
Cohen is describing two distinct steps—that both a finding of manifest unconstitutionality 
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this threshold from one based on inquiry into whether any “credible argument” 
for inconsistency can be made.30 
D. DEBATE OVER THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SECTION 4.1
The foregoing discussion reveals four important features of the section 4.1 
reporting requirement. First, it is clear from available accounts that the 
Department of Justice is involved in providing legal advice about the constitu-
tionality of government-proposed legislation on an ongoing and iterative basis. 
This means there is an opportunity for the government to modify its proposed 
legislation in response to any constitutional concerns before it is introduced in 
the House of Commons. Second, since generating this advice requires a risk 
assessment about the likelihood that a particular bill is inconsistent with the 
Charter, a threshold has been created to determine when the risk is severe enough 
to warrant a report. Third, how this threshold is defined has changed over time. 
And fourth, according to the most authoritative public statements on this topic, 
the current threshold is whether or not the bill is “manifestly unconstitutional.”31 
It is important to underscore the two essential interpretive acts inherent in 
this process. Since section 4.1 provides only the rather vague mandate that a 
report be provided where a government bill is “inconsistent with the purposes 
and provisions” of the Charter, it is government lawyers who are charged with 
both determining the relevant threshold, and subsequently deciding whether 
the standard they have set has been exceeded in a particular instance. As Adam 
Dodek rightly observes, the first of these is a “highly discretionary” act of legal 
interpretation, which will have a significant impact on the number of section 4.1 
reports that are eventually made.32 
and a finding of no credible defense is needed to trigger a report—or whether the latter 
is simply providing content for the threshold established by the former term. My reading 
of the entirety of Cohen’s testimony suggests that one inquiry is performed, and that a 
bill will be deemed manifestly unconstitutional where it is incapable of credible defense. 
This interpretation is supported by the fact that it is difficult to imagine a “manifestly” or 
“obviously” unconstitutional bill that is nonetheless legally defensible. In the event that my 
interpretation on this point is incorrect, however, I note that my analysis of the Human 
Smugglers Act, below, demonstrates that Bills C-49, C-4, and C-31 are both manifestly 
unconstitutional and incapable of credible defense.
30. Ibid at 1120.
31. More information about the current threshold has recently become available as a result of a 
legal challenge launched by a Department of Justice lawyer who alleges ongoing violations of 
the section 4.1 requirements. See Part IV, below, for more information on the status of this 
development at the time of writing.
32. Adam Dodek, “Lawyering at the Intersection of Public Law and Legal Ethics: Government 
Lawyers as Custodians of the Rule of Law” (2010) 33:1 Dal LJ 1 at 25.
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The second interpretive act is to determine whether a particular piece of 
pending government legislation surpasses whatever threshold has been established 
such that it ought to be deemed “inconsistent with the Charter” and thus trigger a 
report. It is perhaps self-evident that since the whole purpose of this second exercise is 
to meaningfully distinguish between bills on either side of a line, there must exist, at 
least at a theoretical level, bills capable of occupying both the “inconsistent” and “not 
inconsistent” categories. Indeed, it is the ability to segregate into two available 
classes that gives any threshold meaning. A key question plaguing section 4.1 
of the Department of Justice Act is whether the complete absence of reports in 
Canada indicates that the threshold for Charter compliance has been interpreted 
in such a way that it is incapable of ever identifying content for the “inconsistent” 
category. If so, it can be said that the reporting requirement is unable to function 
as an effective accountability mechanism. 
Grant Huscroft is among those who argue that this is not the case. He 
states that the lack of section 4.1 reports is neither surprising nor troubling, 
emphasizing that the highly consultative drafting process means that many 
government bills will be amended in response to Charter concerns long before 
they are introduced in the House of Commons.33 Under this view, the threshold 
is adequately performing its distinguishing function and is facilitating not only 
the identification, but also the correction, of any constitutionally deficient bills. 
Thus, according to Huscroft, the ongoing lack of section 4.1 reports is not 
indicative of a failed accountability mechanism, but rather of a process that is 
preventing blatantly unconstitutional legislation from ever being tabled. 
It is worth noting that one of the appeals of a functioning “internal 
correction model”34 of the kind described by Huscroft is that government lawyers 
are almost certainly more likely to raise constitutional concerns when they can 
do so in a way that will not lead to embarrassing and potentially costly political 
consequences for their government clients. A section 4.1 process focused on 
internal correction thus has the benefit of allowing Department of Justice lawyers 
to generate meaningful Charter assessments without being preoccupied with the 
political and institutional implications of doing so. Likewise, the government 
can consider its responses to these concerns in the absence of public scrutiny and 
critique, which may encourage more honest and careful deliberation. 
33. Huscroft, “Reconciling Duty,” supra note 16 at 794. A similar view has been expressed 
during conversations between the author and senior lawyers with the Department of Justice. 
34. The term “internal correction model” is my own but I believe it to be an appropriate label for 
the process Huscroft describes. 
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Huscroft’s defence of the reporting requirement on the basis of internal 
correction is supplemented by his theory of “underdeterminacy,” which 
emphasizes the fact that the Charter is vague and can be the subject of multiple 
legitimate interpretations.35 In Huscroft’s view, this means not only that there can 
be disagreement about how existing case law applies to proposed legislation, but 
also that the Attorney General—as an independent interpreter of the Charter—
can legitimately disagree with judicial precedent when determining whether a 
bill requires a report under section 4.1.36 This portion of his analysis explains 
why constitutionally suspect bills can sometimes be introduced in the House 
of Commons notwithstanding the rigor imposed by a functioning internal 
correction model. The underdeterminate nature of the Charter, Huscroft tells us, 
means that there can be different, but equally legitimate, views about when the 
threshold of inconsistency is passed. As a result, the introduction of controversial 
bills in the absence of accompanying reports is not a reliable indicator of an 
ineffective section 4.1 process, and we should continue to have confidence that 
the most egregious concerns are being identified and corrected before government 
legislation is brought to the House of Commons.
Other commentators are more skeptical that the reporting requirement 
is living up to its promise of providing accountability under Canada’s human 
rights instruments. James Kelly refers to section 4.1 as a mere “procedural 
requirement,” noting that the absence of reports, even in the face of particularly 
controversial legislation, demonstrates the “hollowness” of the duty.37 Kent Roach 
echoes this sentiment and emphasizes the need for the provision to distinguish 
meaningfully between “inconsistent” and “not inconsistent” bills. In his words: 
“[I]f anything and everything can be credibly defended under the Charter, the 
reporting requirement should be repealed as a charade.”38 Roach also takes 
issue with arguments based on underdeterminacy, stating that “a celebration of 
indeterminacy may be an appropriate philosophy for some scholars, but it is not 
35. Huscroft, “Reconciling Duty,” supra note 16 at 778-79. See also Grant A Huscroft “‘Thank 
God We’re Here’: Judicial Exclusivity in Charter Interpretation and Its Consequences” 
(2004) 25 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 241. 
36. Huscroft, “Reconciling Duty,” supra note 16 at 779. 
37. James B Kelly, “Legislative Activism and Parliamentary Bills of Rights: Institutional Lessons 
for Canada” in James B Kelly & Christopher P Manfredi, eds, Contested Constitutionalism 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) 86 at 93 [Kelly, “Legislative Activism”].
38. Kent Roach, “Not Just the Government’s Lawyer: The Attorney General as Defender of 
the Rule of Law” (2006) 31:2 Queen’s LJ 598 at 625 [Roach, “Not Just the Government’s 
Lawyer”]. 
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an appropriate one for a law officer of the Crown.”39 Roach ultimately concludes 
that the complete absence of reporting under section 4.1 is troubling and that the 
requirement has effectively “withered on the vine.”40 
Huscroft’s response to these critiques is significant for our purposes. In an 
article published in 2009, he clarifies that he does not see the Charter as being 
so underdeterminate that a report of inconsistency should never be issued, even 
when the possibility of multiple interpretations is accounted for.41 In so doing, 
Huscroft both acknowledges that the two broad categories of bills relevant to the 
reporting requirement must be capable of delineation—those that are consistent 
with the Charter and those that are not—and agrees with other commentators 
that section 4.1 must be operationalized in a way that is capable of providing 
meaningful distinction between these categories. Huscroft’s response to his critics 
also adds an important observation to his theory of underdeterminacy, noting 
that political considerations offer an additional constraint on the government’s 
ability to introduce legislation that appears on its face to be blatantly inconsistent 
with Charter precedent: 
No Attorney general is likely to adopt an interpretation of the Charter that flouts 
well-settled precedent. The political constraints on doing so are too great, not only 
for the Attorney General but also for the government. Governments will have their 
own reasons for not wanting to introduce a bill that appears to be inconsistent with 
Charter case law, even assuming that the Attorney General were to approve. They 
will not want to pick a fight with the courts, given the respective stature of 
politicians and judges, nor will they want to waste political capital on legislation 
that is obviously vulnerable to judicial invalidation…42
Section 4.1 is thus presented as operating in tandem with political pressures 
that favour Charter compliance. It is suggested that, together, these two 
mechanisms provide suitable accountability measures by ensuring that blatantly 
unconstitutional legislation is rarely introduced. When it is, explicit notice must 
be given through a report to the House of Commons.
An important footnote accompanies Huscroft’s assertion on this point: At 
note 13, he acknowledges that in some situations governments may perceive 
that the political benefits of introducing particular legislation outweighs the 
political downsides of having the measure eventually declared unconstitutional. 
Further, in these situations the government is rewarded not only for introducing 
39. Ibid. 
40. Ibid at 626. 
41. Huscroft, “Reconciling Duty,” supra note 16 at 792-93.
42. Ibid at 780. 
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the controversial measures, but also for later criticizing the courts for striking 
down popular legislation.43 Huscroft does not elaborate on how his observation 
in footnote 13 intersects with the reporting requirement, but I would argue that 
these are precisely the types of situations in which we would expect section 4.1 of 
the Department of Justice Act to yield a report: When the government decides that 
it is “indifferent to the constitutional fate of its legislation”44 it should nonetheless 
be mandated by virtue of the reporting requirement to make the House of 
Commons and the Canadian public aware of its decision to proceed, despite 
significant Charter risks. This does not prevent such legislation from becoming 
law, of course, but it does require public admission by the government that it is 
pursuing a legislative agenda that appears to be inconsistent with the instruments 
designed to protect fundamental rights. 
Elmer Driedger reached a similar conclusion in 1977, stating that 
the chances that a statute patently in conflict with the Bill of Rights could be 
enacted are virtually non-existent, unless that were deliberate government policy, 
in which case the declaration would go in and the Government would have to face 
the music in the House of Commons.45 
Driedger also emphasizes the important democratic role the requirement 
plays, noting that the accountability scheme introduced in the Bill of Rights 
ensures that where the government knowingly tables legislation that does not 
comply with its guarantees, “[t]he issue would then be squarely before Parliament 
and, if the bill became law, would ultimately be adjudged by the electorate.”46
In my view, it is these situations that present the true litmus test for the 
effectiveness of section 4.1. It is conceivable, perhaps even desirable, that the 
vetting and reporting functions constitute part of an effective internal correction 
process, and that the lack of reports in Canada is, as Huscroft suggests, indicative 
of its success as an accountability mechanism because the majority of major 
Charter deficiencies are corrected before bills are even introduced. It is also likely 
that in some situations there will be legitimate disagreement about whether a 
particular bill is inconsistent with the Charter. Therefore, critique of proposed 
legislation on Charter grounds, or even subsequent invalidation by a court, is 
also not conclusive evidence of a failed accountability mechanism, since this 
could merely reflect the difficult interpretative tasks involved in assessing Charter 
43. Ibid at 780, n 13. 
44. Ibid.
45. Driedger, supra note 16 at 311 [emphasis added]. 
46. Ibid. 
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compliance. Further, while I am more skeptical about the legitimacy of a failure 
to provide a section 4.1 report on the basis that judicial precedent is deemed 
by another interpreter as “wrong,” I am willing to accept that disagreement on 
the margins of the case law may be acceptable in some circumstances. Thus, 
neither the lack of reports nor the presence of genuine and legitimate debate 
about the Charter compliance of particular bills is alone sufficient to demonstrate 
that Canada’s reporting requirement is ineffective. However, when a government 
chooses to introduce legislation that is obviously inconsistent with clear and 
recent judicial precedent from this country’s highest court because it deems it 
politically advantageous to do so, a meaningful application of section 4.1 ought 
to find inconsistency and trigger a report. If it does not, one must conclude that 
the mechanism designed to ensure public accountability has failed. 
In the section that follows, I will argue that this is exactly what occurred 
when the government introduced The Human Smugglers Act.
II. A CASE STUDY IN MANIFEST UNCONSTITUTIONALITY: 
THE POLITICS AND CONTENT OF THE HUMAN 
SMUGGLERS ACT
The Human Smugglers Act amended the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
[IRPA],47 the Balanced Refugee Reform Act [BRRA],48 and the Marine Transportation 
Security Act.49 Collectively, these changes give the government power to designate 
certain groups of arrivals to Canada as “irregular.”50 The result of this designation 
is a modified process for those wishing to claim asylum, as well as modified rights 
once status as a legal refugee has been obtained.
The context in which the Human Smugglers Act was introduced is significant. 
In August 2010, the MV Sun Sea arrived in Canadian waters carrying 492 Sri 
Lankan Tamils.51 All of the men, women, and children onboard the ship claimed 
that they were fleeing persecution and thus entitled to protection as refugees. 
The government greeted the boat with military vessels and immediately detained 
47. SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].
48. SC 2010, c 8 [BRRA]. 
49. SC 1994, c 40.
50. Bill C-49, supra note 1 at cl 4. See also Bill C-4, supra note 4 at cl 5; Bill C-31, supra note 5 
at cl 10 (which introduced IRPA, s 20.1).
51. Adrian Humphreys, “MV Sun Sea passenger loses refugee status after court denies his claim 
that Sri Lanka could falsely link him to Tamil rebels,” National Post (21 January 2013), 
online: <http://www.nationalpost.com>.
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all of the claimants.52 It also declared publicly that the Sun Sea posed a threat to 
both Canada’s national security and the integrity of our immigration system as a 
result of what it viewed as blatant “queue jumping” by those on board, some of 
whom could have links to a terrorist organization.53 Bill C-49, the first iteration 
of the Human Smugglers Act, was introduced two months later. At that time, the 
government portrayed the bill as a critical part of its “crackdown” on human 
smugglers. Although the bill died on the order paper when a federal election was 
called in March 2011, the Human Smugglers Act was reintroduced as Bill C-4 by 
a strengthened majority government in June 2011. Nine months later, all of its 
provisions were rolled into Bill C-31, an omnibus refugee bill that introduced 
sweeping changes to the process and substance of Canada’s asylum system.54
This section identifies key provisions of the Human Smugglers Act and argues 
that Bills C-49, C-4, and C-31 were manifestly unconstitutional at the time they 
were introduced by the government. As a result, each ought to have triggered a 
section 4.1 report to the House of Commons. It is significant that none of them 
did. Further, the political environment in which this legislation was introduced 
supports a conclusion that the government likely saw strategic advantage in 
proceeding with the bills, notwithstanding the constitutional violations they 
contained. The absence of a report in these circumstances is particularly troubling 
and highlights the abject failure of section 4.1 to serve as an effective account-
ability mechanism, even when it is most needed.
52. Detention of foreign nationals is governed by sections 54–61 of the un-modified IRPA. 
See IRPA, supra note 47, ss 54-61. Commentators criticized the Sun Sea detentions on the 
basis that they were longer than necessary and thus violated fundamental human rights. See 
Canadian Council for Refugees, Media Release, “Rights advocates decry detention of refugee 
claimants from MV Sun Sea” (10 February 2011) online: <http://ccrweb.ca>.
53. See e.g. Vic Toews, “Human Smuggling and the Abuse of Canada’s Refugee System,” (Speech 
delivered at Marine Base, Unit 3, Vancouver, British Columbia, 21 October 2010), online: 
Public Safety Canada <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/nws/spchs/2010/20101021-eng.
aspx>. Canada put the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on its list of terrorist 
organizations in 2006. See Public Safety Canada, “Currently listed entities” (7 August 2013), 
online: <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-eng.
aspx>.
54. This paper focuses only on the portions of Bill C-31 that were previously contained in Bills 
C-49 and C-4. For government backgrounders on a variety of key changes proposed in Bill 
C-31, including many not discussed here, see Citizenship and Immigration Canada, News 
Release, “Harper Government Introduces the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act” 
(16 February 2012) online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca>. For a commentary of some of these 
changes, see Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, “CARL Responds to New Refugee 
Legislation” (16 February 2012), online: CARL <http://refugeelawyersgroup.ca/billc31>; 
Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, “Bill C-31: The Minister says one thing; his Bill 
says another” (22 March 2012), online: CARL <http://www.carl-acaadr.ca/articles/40>.
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A. KEY PROVISIONS OF THE HUMAN SMUGGLERS ACT
Despite its rhetorical title,55 a very small minority of the provisions in the Human 
Smugglers Act deal specifically with those who might be accused of human 
smuggling.56 This is likely a result of the fact that severe sanctions were already 
in place when the Sun Sea’s arrival prompted the drafting of Bill C-49: The 
un-modified IRPA57 specifies that those who knowingly assist large groups of 
individuals to come to Canada without appropriate documentation are liable 
for a fine of up to one million dollars and life imprisonment.58 Also surprising 
is the fact that the bills—which were promoted widely by government ministers 
standing in front of a large and rather ominous-looking photo of the Sun Sea59—
do not deal specifically with asylum seekers traveling by boat, or otherwise make 
distinctions based on mode of arrival. Instead, the legislation gives the Minister 
55. For some interesting reflections on the increasingly rhetorical nature of bill titles 
generally, see Bruce Cheadle, “Lawful Access: Bill On Online Surveillance Not The First 
With Motherhood Title,” The Huffington Post (16 February 2012) online: <http://www.
huffingtonpost.ca/>.
56. For provisions that deal with human smuggling directly, see Bill C-31, supra note 5, cls 
41-42, 70-77. 
57. Supra note 48. The IRPA is the framework legislation governing Canada’s immigration and 
refugee processes and the majority of major changes proposed in the Human Smugglers Act 
are realized through amendment to its provisions.
58. Ibid, s 117. Despite the availability of these severe sanctions, s 117 has rarely been used, and 
since 2002, there have been a limited number of criminal cases under the section. See R v 
Damani, [2003] OJ No 5493 (Ct J); R v Bello, [2004] OJ No 5312 (Ct J); R v Bejashvili, 
2007 QCCQ 15809, [2007] JQ No 16211 (crim & pén); R v Savaresse-Belapatino, 2007 
QCCQ 1251, [2007] JQ No 1448 (crim & pén); R v Ng, 2008 BCCA 535, 241 CCC 
(3d) 340; R v Alzehrani, [2009] OJ No 5797 (Sup Ct); R v Toor, [2009] OJ No 5982, 89 
Imm LR (3d) 248 (Sup Ct); R v Singh-Murray, 2011 NBPC 34, 380 NBR (2d) 74; R v 
Prone, 2012 BCPC 219, 12 Imm LR (4th) 89. Four individuals accused under s 117 of the 
unmodified IRPA successfully challenged the constitutionality of the provision (as worded 
prior to Bill C-31’s entrance into force), claiming that it inadvertently captured the actions 
of humanitarian workers and close family members, and therefore was inconsistent with 
principles of fundamental justice contrary to s 7 of the Charter. The BC Supreme Court 
agreed and held that s 117(1) was overbroad and therefore of no force and effect. The 
decision is currently under appeal. See R v Appulonappa, 2013 BCSC 31, 358 DLR (4th) 
666. The Human Smugglers Act modifies s 117 by introducing new mandatory minimum 
sentences and creating culpability in situations of recklessness.
59. The standard image used to promote the bill is available at Public Safety Canada, “Human 
Smuggling” (5 July 2012), online: <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/
hmn-smgglng/index-eng.aspx>.
BOND, FAILURE TO REPORT 393
very broad discretion to declare a group60 of arrivals “irregular” regardless of their 
mode of entry into Canada.61 The bills permit such a designation whenever the 
minister is (a) is of the opinion that investigating or establishing the identity of 
any member(s) of the group cannot be conducted in a timely fashion; or, (b) has 
reasonable grounds to suspect that an individual has profited from assisting the 
group to reach Canada without complying with “normal” processes, including 
acquiring necessary visas and other documentation.62 The designation criteria 
are inherently vague, and thus leave the minister with tremendous discretion to 
determine which groups will be designated. 
Individuals falling within a group of irregular arrivals are deemed to be 
“designated foreign nationals” and the majority of the Human Smugglers Act 
introduces amendments that alter the asylum claims process for those who have 
been so labeled. Perhaps most significantly, the bills proposed a mandatory 
detention scheme for all designated foreign nationals. Although there is slight 
variation in the detail between versions of the Human Smugglers Act, the 
foundational elements of the detention scheme were consistent at the time each 
of Bills C-4, C-49, and C-31 were tabled in the House of Commons.
Bills C-49 and C-4 introduced a mandatory detention scheme that applied 
to all designated foreign nationals. This regime required a minimum detention 
period of twelve months, and detention could not be reviewed prior to expiration 
of this period. Subsequent detention review was only permitted once every 
six months.63 Bill C-31 altered this scheme slightly by specifying that only 
designated foreign nationals aged sixteen and over would be subject to mandatory 
detention.64 Although the bill is silent on what will happen to those under the 
age of sixteen, statements by government ministers at the time of its introduction 
suggested an intent that children whose parents are in detention would either be 
detained with them or taken into custody by the relevant provincial child welfare 
60. It is significant to note that the Bill does not define the term “group,” meaning that any 
claimant who does not arrive alone may be susceptible to being declared a designated foreign 
national. Ambiguity regarding this term further expands the minister’s discretionary power to 
designate.
61. Bill C-31, supra note 5, cl 10 (the designation provision). See also Bill C-4, supra note 4, cl 5; 
Bill C-49, supra note 1, cl 4.
62. Ibid. See also Bill C-4, supra note 4, cl 5; Bill C-31, supra note 5, cl 10.
63. Bill C-49, supra note 1, cls 9-11 (amending IRPA, ss 55-57). The only exception is that 
release can (but not “must”) occur once status is granted. See also Bill C-4, supra note 4, cls 
10-12. 
64. Bill C-31, supra note 5, cl 23(3).
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agency.65 All other aspects of the regime remained unchanged until the Minister 
of Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism, Jason Kenney, announced 
further modifications several months after the Human Smugglers Act had been 
re-introduced as part of Bill C-31, and following two weeks of expert testimony 
on a variety of aspects of the omnibus bill. The changes allow designated foreign 
nationals access to detention review within fourteen days, and to subsequent 
reviews every six months. Further, they granted the Minister of Public Safety the 
ability to order the release of designated foreign nationals at any time, although 
only on the minister’s own initiative.66 It is noteworthy for our purposes that 
government lawyers were required to assess the constitutionality of each of Bills 
C-49, C-4, and C-31 before they were introduced in the House of Commons 
and thus, in the case of C-31, before this final modification. 
In addition to mandatory detention, the Human Smugglers Act also stipulates 
that a designated foreign national must wait at least five years from the date of a final 
determination regarding refugee status before applying for permanent residency,67 
for a temporary resident permit,68 or to stay in Canada on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds,69 and, further, that either permanent residency or a 
temporary resident permit is required for issuance of a refugee travel document.70 
Designated individuals are unable to access the Refugee Appeal Division 
(RAD)71 and may be subject to reporting conditions even after refugee status 
65. House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 97 (15 March 2012) at 1100, 1540, 1605 
(Kevin Lamoureux, Hon Vic Toews, Hon Bal Gosal, Kennedy Stewart, Joy Smith, Hon Jason 
Kenney).
66. Bill C-31, supra note 5, cl 27 (adding IRPA, s 58.1).
67. Bill C-31, supra note 5, cl 5 (amending IRPA, s 11). See also Bill C-49, supra note 1, cl 3; Bill 
C-4, supra note 4, cl 4; 
68. Bill C-31, supra note 5, cl 12 (amending IRPA, s 24). See also Bill C-49, supra note 1, cl 6; 
Bill C-4, supra note 4, cl 7. 
69. Bill C-49, supra note 1 at cl 7 (amending IRPA, s 25). See also Bill C-4, supra note 4 at cl 8; 
Bill C-31, supra note 5 at cl 13(1).
70. Bill C-31, supra note 5, cl 16 (amending IRPA, s 31). See also Bill C-49, supra note 1, cl 8; 
Bill C-4, supra note 4, cl 9.
71. Bill C-31, supra note 5, cl 36 (amending IRPA, s 110). See also Bill C-49, supra note 1, cl 16; 
Bill C-4, supra note 4, cl 17. Although the un-modified IRPA includes a section establishing 
the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD), this section was never brought into force. The BRRA 
is intended to actually operationalize the RAD. However, Bill C-31 also restricts the RAD’s 
availability in certain circumstances: In addition to decisions denying status to those deemed 
to be “designated foreign nationals,” the RAD will also be unavailable for decisions: declaring 
a claim to be withdrawn or abandoned; rejecting a claim on the basis it has no credible basis; 
rejecting a claim on the basis that it is manifestly unfounded; rejecting a claim made by an 
individual who, although he or she has travelled through a Safe Third Country, fits within an 
exception to the rule that generally prohibits claims from such individuals; rejecting a claim 
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has been granted.72 The majority of the Human Smugglers Act is retroactive, in 
that the designation procedure—and a majority of the consequences of being 
designated—can be applied to any group that arrived after 31 March 2009.73 As 
a result, passengers of the Sun Sea could be subject to designation once the act 
came into force.74
It is important to note that non-designated asylum seekers may also be 
detained upon arrival to Canada where there are concerns regarding their identity 
or their likelihood to miss a necessary appearance, or reasonable grounds to 
believe that they are a danger to the public or inadmissible for security-related 
reasons.75 Unlike under the Human Smugglers Act, however, such detentions must 
be reviewed twice within the first seven days,76 and every thirty days thereafter.77 
Release will be ordered unless specific factors justifying ongoing detention are 
triggered.78 Further, the requirement that five years pass before various applica-
tions are made does not apply, travel documents are available to those who have 
been granted refugee status, and appeals to the RAD will be possible for most 
claimants as soon as the division is operational.79 
The result of these provisions is that the Human Smugglers Act creates two 
very different refugee systems: one for individuals who arrive as part of a group 
by an individual who is a national of a country that the minister has designated as a Safe 
Country of Origin; finding that previously granted refugee protection has ceased; or vacating 
an earlier decision to grant refugee protection.
72. Bill C-31, supra note 5, cl 32 (adding IRPA, s 98.1). See also Bill C-49, supra note 1, cl 15; 
Bill C-4, supra note 4, cl 16.
73. Bill C-49, supra note 1, cls 33(1)-(2). Individuals who arrived prior to the coming into force 
of the amendments and are not in detention on the date they become designated foreign 
nationals are not subject to the mandatory period of detention (ibid at cl 33(3)). See also Bill 
C-4, supra note 4, cl 34; Bill C-31, supra note 5, cl 81.
74. At the time of writing, twenty-six Sun Sea passengers have been ordered deported; eighty 
have been accepted as refugees; and eighty-two have had their claims rejected. See Stewart 
Bell, “From port to port: Newly declassified document shows the ‘horrible’ voyage of the MV 
Sun Sea,” National Post (25 March 2013) online: <http:// http://www.nationalpost.com/>. 
This means that many Sun Sea passengers could still be subjected to retroactive designation 
under Bill C-31. 
75. IRPA, supra note 47, s 55.
76. Ibid, ss 57(1), (2). 
77. Ibid, s 57(2).
78. These factors are listed in the IRPA. See ibid, s 58. 
79. Bill C-31 does, however, restrict the availability of the RAD to certain other types of 
claimants as well. 
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that the minister declares “irregular” and one for other claimants.80 The government’s 
justification for this differentiation is that the more punitive system for those 
arriving in ways it does not like sends “a clear message that the abuse of our 
immigration system will not be tolerated.”81 
B. MANIFEST UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
A variety of political, legal, and constitutional allegations have been levied against 
the Human Smugglers Act. Commentators have attacked the designation process 
as discriminatory, the retroactivity clause and the lack of appeal mechanism as 
contrary to principles of fundamental justice, and the five years delay provisions 
as violations of rights to family life and facilitated integration.82 This paper will 
not grapple with the majority of these allegations. Rather, I focus exclusively on 
the proposed detention provisions, and demonstrate that at least some portions 
of Bills C-49, C-4, and the C-31 ran directly contrary to recent and leading 
constitutional authorities. I therefore conclude that these provisions rendered the 
Human Smugglers Act “manifestly unconstitutional,” and thus, that a section 4.1 
report should have accompanied its introduction in the House of Commons all 
three times it was tabled.
It is important to highlight from the outset that this analysis focuses 
exclusively on the three versions of the Human Smugglers Act that were considered 
80. Bill C-31 also significantly modifies the refugee claims process for individuals arriving from 
designated countries of origin (DCO). The minister can designate a country of origin on the 
basis of a low acceptance rate from claimants originating from that country or its perceived 
democratic structure. See Bill C-31, supra note 5, cl 58. Arrival from a DCO results in faster 
processing timelines and an inability to access the RAD, but does not lead to mandatory 
detention or affect the rights of individuals after they have been declared legitimate refugees 
(unlike the consequences of being a designated foreign national). 
81. Alexandra Posadzki, “Government says high number of immigrants will help economic 
recovery,” The Globe and Mail (13 February 2011), online: <http://theglobeandmail.com> 
(quoting Minister Jason Kenney).
82. For a summary of some of the arguments relating to the constitutionality of the Human 
Smugglers Act, see e.g. CCR, “Bill C-4,” supra note 3; Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 
“Bill C-31: An Unjustified Assault on the Rights of People in Danger” (30 April 
2012), online: <http://ccla.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/2012-04-30-
Submissions-to-Committee-FINAL.pdf>; Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, “The 
Unconstitutionality of Bill C-4, The Preventing Human Smugglers from Abusing Canada’s 
Immigration System Act” (October 2011), online: University of Ottawa Human Rights 
Research and Education Centre <http://www.cdp-hrc.uottawa.ca/projects/refugeeforum/
projects/documents/TheUnconstitutionalityofBillC4final.pdf>; Canadian Council for 
Refugees, “Bill C31 – Diminishing Refugee Protection” (April 2012), online: CCR <http://
ccrweb.ca/files/ccrbriefc31.pdf> [CCR, “Bill C-31”].
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under section 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act. As a result, the following 
paragraphs account for changes made to Bill C-31 before it was introduced, but 
do not assess the constitutionality of the amendments that were made after the 
bill went to committee. While I do not believe that these amendments render the 
Human Smugglers Act constitutionally compliant, it is significant that this more 
moderate version of the detention scheme was not before Department of Justice 
lawyers prior to the tabling of Bills C-49, C-4, or C-31.
It is also noteworthy that while controversial,83 the detention of asylum 
seekers who have been neither convicted nor charged with a criminal act occurs 
with some frequency in Canada and, indeed, in many other countries.84 Refugee 
claimants (and other non-Canadians in Canada) benefit from the Charter’s 
guarantees,85 but certain forms of immigration detention are assumed to represent 
an acceptable balance between the protected liberty interests of the individual, 
the security interests of the public, and the sovereignty of the state. As a result, 
such detentions may be Charter compliant where they are non-arbitrary and in 
conformity with the principles of fundamental justice.86 
In 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada (the Court) considered the 
constitutionality of one particularly contentious—and widely publicized—
form of immigration detention: the detention of non-Canadians who have been 
deemed inadmissible to Canada on security grounds but denied access to the 
evidence used to reach this decision against them. The IRPA provides a process 
for the use of confidential information in proceedings of this nature and further 
allows for the detention and deportation of affected individuals subsequent to 
83. See e.g. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR urges states to avoid 
detaining asylum-seekers” (12 May 2011), online: <http://www.unhcr.org>; Michael Flynn, 
“Immigration Detention and Proportionality: Global Detention Project Working Paper No. 
4” (February 2011), online: Global Detention Project <http://www.globaldetentionproject.
org/fileadmin/publications/GDP_detention_and_proportionality_workingpaper.pdf>.
84. For example, Australia, Greece, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, Morocco, South Africa, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States all have policies for detaining new arrivals under 
certain (non-criminal) circumstances. For examples of these policies and details according 
to country, see Global Detention Project, “Country Profiles,” online: <http://www.
globaldetentionproject.org/countries.html>. 
85. See Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 SCR 177, 17 DLR (4th) 422. 
86. See Sahin v Canada, [1995] 1 FC 214, 85 FTR 99. Although detention under the IRPA for 
non-security purposes has not been directly considered by the Supreme Court of Canada, the 
Court has noted in obiter that the presence of a “comprehensive and expert statutory scheme 
which provides for review at least as broad as that available by way of habeas corpus” may 
preclude the need for habeas corpus in certain circumstances. May v Ferndale Institution, 2005 
SCC 82 at para 40, [2005] 3 SCR 809.
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the issuance of a special “security certificate” based on the protected evidence.87 
In R v Charkaoui,88 the Court identified two critical concerns with the security 
certificate regime. First, it noted that while permanent residents subject to 
security certificates could be detained under the IRPA, foreign nationals in 
the same situation had to be detained.89 Second, the Court highlighted the 
requirement that detention of permanent residents be reviewed within 48 hours, 
while foreign nationals were statutorily barred from even applying for review 
until 120 days after a judge of the Federal Court determined the reasonableness 
of the underlying certificate.90 The result of these two features of the regime was a 
bifurcated system in which the procedural protections afforded to certain security 
certificate detainees were denied to others.
The Court ultimately held that detention under the IRPA’s security certificate 
regime violated Charter rights against arbitrary detention and denial of habeas 
corpus. Further, the Court found that compliance with the rights not to be 
subjected to cruel and unusual treatment and deprived of one’s liberty except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice depends on a process that 
“provides regular opportunities for review of detention”91 and takes into account 
a series of relevant factors provided by the Court.92 
There is no easy way to reconcile the Court’s recent holdings in Charkaoui with 
a view that the detention provisions in Bills C-49, C-4, and C-31 are constitutional. 
Three particular aspects of the Court’s analysis are problematic for the Human 
Smugglers Act: (a) the need for a personalized detention trigger; (b) the requirement 
for timely and regular detention review, even in the face of a potential security 
threat; and, (c) the need to respect principles of fundamental justice and avoid 
cruel and unusual punishment. Each of these aspects is discussed in more detail 
below. This is followed by analysis concluding that there is a lack of legal justification 
for any of these prima facie violations of the Charter.
87. The certificate is issued by the relevant ministers and reviewed by a judge who determines 
whether the issuance was reasonable. See IRPA, supra note 48, s 77. See also Charkaoui 
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 at para 5, [2007] 1 SCR 350, 
[Charkaoui]. Charkaoui dealt with the use of confidential information in the security 
certificate process, with the court finding that processes preventing the detainee and his or 
her counsel from accessing the information violated the Charter. See Charter, supra note 3.
88. Supra note 87.
89. Ibid at para 6. The security certificate regime applies to permanent residents and foreign 
nationals. The IRPA defines the latter as “a person who is not a Canadian citizen or a 
permanent resident, and includes a stateless person.” See IRPA, supra note 48, s 2(1).
90. Charkaoui, supra note 87 at para 6. 
91. Ibid at para 110.
92. Ibid at paras 88-127.
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1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL NEED FOR A PERSONALIZED DETENTION 
TRIGGER
Despite finding that the IRPA’s security certificate regime violated the Charter, 
the Court rejected an argument that the mandatory nature of the detention 
for foreign nationals was itself sufficient to render the entire process arbitrary, 
finding instead that the signing of the security certificate constituted a 
“triggering event” sufficient to legitimize the detention. According to the Court, 
“the signature of a certificate … is necessarily related to the dangerousness of 
the individual,” and therefore provides a “rational” (rather than arbitrary) 
foundation for the detention.93 The Court explained that this personalized 
triggering event distinguished detention under the security certificate regime 
from unconstitutional detention under former Criminal Code provisions that 
applied to all individuals acquitted from criminal conviction by reason of 
insanity.94 In Charkaoui, the Court emphasized that the latter kind of detention 
was unconstitutionally arbitrary because not all of the individuals being detained 
under the impugned provisions were dangerous.95 
Indeed, a majority of the Court in R v Swain had already noted its concern 
that the mandatory detention being considered in that criminal law case was 
automatic in every situation “without any rational standard for determining 
which individual insanity acquittees should be detained and which should be 
released.”96 Significantly, the Court in Swain reached this conclusion after rejecting 
government arguments that the legislation itself provided a sufficient trigger 
because the detention scheme applied by definition only to individuals convicted 
of certain criminal acts and acquitted due to insanity. While acknowledging 
that only particular individuals could be detained, a majority of the Court 
rejected this non-personalized approach, finding that the legislation was “still 
arbitrary in the way that it operates with respect to them [because] … [n]ot 
all of these individuals will be dangerous.”97 It also warned that the lack of 
93. Ibid at para 89. 
94. See R v Swain, [1991] 1 SCR 993, 63 CCC (3d) 481 [Swain]. It is noteworthy that when 
the impugned Criminal Code provisions were subsequently revised, new language was also 
introduced. See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. This eliminated the troubling term 
“insanity” and introduced the lexicon of “not criminally responsible for reasons of mental 
disorder (NCRMD).” Since the legal analysis in Swain refers to the former provisions, my 
discussion here adopts the associated terminology. 
95. Charkaoui, supra note 88 at para 89. For the case cited in Charkaoui, see Swain, supra note 
94.
96. Ibid at para 130. 
97. Ibid at para 131.
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discretion inherent in mandatory detention will, in many cases, “render arbitrary the 
law’s application.”98
Bills C-49, C-4, and C-31 introduced detention based on a group designation 
process that does not take into account the personalized circumstances or 
characteristics of particular detainees. According to the scheme, if the Minister 
determines that a group is designated,99 any individual who arrives within 
that group and does not hold valid entry documentation (as is the case with 
the majority of asylum seekers) becomes a “designated foreign national” and 
is automatically detained for at least twelve months. Although it is obviously 
individual men, women, and children—each with their own histories and 
profiles—who will actually be subjected to this lengthy period of detention, the 
designation procedure is specifically designed to avoid an individualized process 
and instead attaches incredible consequences to a group label. This is particularly 
notable in Bills C-49 and C-4, where even an individual’s status as a young child 
is not deemed a relevant consideration. 
Further, the trigger for the group designation is itself vague and potentially 
completely benign: Recall that one of the potential triggers is that the Minister 
simply believes that examinations of the group cannot be conducted in a timely 
manner. The result is a scheme that mandates detention with no assessment 
of the individual’s personal circumstances;100 no determination of how feasible 
it might be to determine his or her identity or admissibility in a timely way; 
no investigation into his or her potential involvement with human smugglers, 
criminal organizations, or terrorist groups; no inquiry into the likelihood that a 
hearing date will be missed; and no evaluation to determine whether or not he 
or she poses a danger in any way. In short, there is no assessment to determine 
whether there are any rational grounds whatsoever to justify the detention. 
The complete absence of a personalized detention trigger renders the scheme 
proposed in the Human Smugglers Act directly analogous to the automatic 
detention provisions found to be unconstitutional in Swain. The need for a 
98. Ibid at para 130. For the case cited with approval in Swain, see R v Lyons, [1987] 2 SCR 309 
at 348, 44 DLR (4th) 193.
99. Recall that this can be done where the minister is of the opinion that examinations and 
investigations of persons in the group cannot be conducted in a timely manner or that there 
are reasonable grounds to suspect either that a criminal or terrorist organization has benefited 
from assisting the group, or that the group has been assisted by an individual who has 
profited. 
100. A small exception may be available in rare cases, since the minister is able to order release in 
“exceptional circumstances.” See Bill C-49, supra note 1, cl 13 (IRPA, s 58.1); Bill C-4, supra 
note 4, cl 14; Bill C-31, supra note 5, cl 27.
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personalized assessment prior to detention was forcefully and recently reiterated 
by a unanimous Court in Charkaoui. There is thus leading and direct authority 
indicating that, subject to a potential justification under section 1,101 this aspect 
of the Human Smugglers Act constitutes a violation of the Charter. 
2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL NEED FOR TIMELY REVIEW OF DETENTION
In Charkaoui, the court rejected a detention scheme that prohibited review for 
120 days, finding that although some flexibility may be needed where a terrorist 
threat necessitates immediate action, even that possibility could not “justify the 
complete denial of a timely detention review.”102 The court cited periods of 24 to 
48 hours as guidance as to what might be considered “acceptable delays” before 
deprivations of liberty need to be reviewed,103 noting that permanent residents 
held under security certificates benefit from automatic review within 48 hours. 
Bills C-49, C-4, and C-31 introduced a mandatory detention scheme that is 
non-reviewable for 245 days more than the period that was rejected in Charkaoui, 
and in the absence of the compelling secrecy and security issues that complicate 
the security certificate context. 
This latter point must be emphasized. The group designation process 
proposed in the Human Smugglers Act means that individuals can be designated 
and detained without any evidence that they pose a threat to security or constitute 
a flight risk. This is in contrast to the situation in Charkaoui, where there was 
individualized evidence that each of the detainees represented a “threat to the 
security of Canada by reason of involvement in terrorist activities.”104 In that 
case, the 120 days of detention without review was found to violate the Charter’s 
guarantee against arbitrary detention notwithstanding the severity of this risk. 
In its reasons, the Court emphasized that “[w]hether through habeas corpus or 
statutory mechanisms, foreign nationals, like others, have a right to prompt 
review to ensure that their detention complies with the law.”105 Application of 
this same principle to the Human Smugglers Act leads to the inevitable conclusion 
that the creation of a mandatory, 365-day unreviewable detention period106 
101. Charter, supra note 3, s 1. Section 1 of the Charter provides the government an opportunity 
to justify prima facie violations of Charter rights. This aspect is discussed in more detail in 
“The inability to justify the prima facie Charter violations,” below.
102. Charkaoui, supra note 87 at para 93. 
103. Ibid at para 91. 
104. Ibid at para 10.
105. Ibid at para 90. 
106. Note that the Human Smugglers Act permits (but does not require) release if the claim for 
refugee status is processed within the 365 days period of mandatory detention. At the time 
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for individuals against whom there is no evidence of a security concern also 
constitutes a prima facie violation of Charter rights.
3. THE CONSTITUTIONAL NEED TO RESPECT PRINCIPLES OF 
FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE AND AVOID CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
TREATMENT
The Court in Charkaoui rejected arguments that extended periods of detention 
under the security certificate regime violated guarantees against cruel and unusual 
punishment and the right not to be deprived of liberty except in accordance with 
the principles of fundamental justice.107 This rejection was grounded in a finding 
that an assessment of personalized factors could justify the ongoing detention. In 
reaching this conclusion, the court once again relied on the existence of a regular 
review process that took into account the circumstances of each individual 
detainee:
…the s. 7 principles of fundamental justice and the s. 12 guarantee of freedom from 
cruel and unusual treatment require that, where a person is detained or is subject 
to onerous conditions of release for an extended period under immigration law, the 
detention or the conditions must be accompanied by a meaningful process of ongo-
ing review that takes into account the context and circumstances of the individual 
case. Such persons must have meaningful opportunities to challenge their continued 
detention or the conditions of their release.108
Given that the detentions authorized by the Human Smugglers Act are not 
premised on an assessment of the “context and circumstances of each individual” 
and are devoid of regular and ongoing review mechanisms, it seems most likely 
that its detention scheme is also in contravention of these additional Charter rights.
C. THE INABILITY TO JUSTIFY THE PRIMA FACIE CHARTER VIOLATIONS
The Court in Charkaoui did not provide a robust explanation of why it found 
the prima facie Charter breaches relating to detention in the context of security 
certificates unjustifiable. Section 1 of the Charter allows the government to 
defend an apparent rights violation on the basis that it is justified in a free and 
of writing, estimated average processing time for a refugee claim in Canada is 19–20 months. 
See Bill C-49, supra note 1 at cl 10 (amending IRPA, ss 56). See also Bill C-4, supra note 
4 at cl 11. The Canadian Bar Association maintains that release under such a provision 
would be unlikely. See Canadian Bar Association, “Bill C-49, Preventing Human Smugglers 
from Abusing Canada’s Immigration System Act” (November 2010), online: Canadian Bar 
Association <http://www.cba.org/cba/submissions/pdf/10-78-eng.pdf> at 5-6. 
107. These rights are protected by ss 12 and 7 of the Charter, respectively. Supra note 3, ss 12, 7.
108. Charkaoui, supra note 87 at para 107 [emphasis added]. 
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democratic society.109 It is well established in Canadian law that a section 1 
analysis requires consideration of: (a) the objective of the legislation; (b) whether 
a rational connection exists between the objective and the impugned provisions; 
(c) whether the claimant’s rights have been minimally impaired; and, (d) whether 
the salutary benefits of allowing the violation outweigh the deleterious effects.110 
Although a rigorous application of each phase of the section 1 framework (also 
called the “Oakes test,” after the case in which it was established) was not offered 
in Charkaoui, the Court did conclude explicitly that even if a terrorist threat 
required immediate state action in the absence of a fully documented case, lack of 
a timely detention review would not be justified. The Court further held that the 
presence of a 48-hour review period for permanent residents subject to security 
certificates meant that the 120-day denial of review for foreign nationals could 
not be said to constitute a “minimal impairment” of the protected rights, thus 
indicating that the scheme would fail the section 1 analysis on this basis.111
It must again be noted that the unreviewable detention period introduced by 
Bills C-49, C-4, and C-31 is significantly longer than that considered in Charkaoui, 
while the competing security risks are far less concrete or imminent—if they 
are present at all. Further, it is significant that detainees in a direct comparator 
group—non-designated refugee claimants—benefit from review within 48 hours 
of detention. Just as the government was unable to justify offering timely review 
for some security certificate detainees and not others, there are no considerations 
that justify detention of designated foreign nationals seeking asylum for 182 
times longer than non-designated asylum seekers.
109. Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states: “The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.” Charter, supra note 3, s 1.
110. See R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) 200. 
111. Charkaoui, supra note 87 at para 93. The Court held: 
It is clear that there may be a need for some flexibility regarding the period for which a 
suspected terrorist may be detained. Confronted with a terrorist threat, state officials may 
need to act immediately, in the absence of a fully documented case. It may take some time 
to verify and document the threat. Where state officials act expeditiously, the failure to meet 
an arbitrary target of a fixed number of hours should not mean the automatic release of the 
person, who may well be dangerous. However, this cannot justify the complete denial of a timely 
detention review. Permanent residents who pose a danger to national security are also meant 
to be removed expeditiously. If this objective can be pursued while providing permanent residents 
with a mandatory detention review within 48 hours, then how can a denial of review for foreign 
nationals for 120 days after the certificate is confirmed be considered a minimal impairment?” 
[emphasis added].
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The section 1 analysis in Swain is also instructive on this point. In that case, 
six of seven judges found that the mandatory detention of individuals found to be 
insane at the time they committed a crime was unconstitutional and could not be 
saved by section 1. The majority accepted that the impugned legislation had the 
pressing and substantial objective of protecting the public and preventing crime. 
It also concluded that there was a rational connection between this objective 
and the detention of all insanity acquittees since the impugned scheme would 
necessarily have the effect of ensuring that the individuals who posed a legitimate 
threat due to ongoing insanity were not released. The section 1 justification failed, 
however, at the minimum impairment stage of the analysis. Here, a majority of 
the Court concluded that insanity acquittees should be detained “no longer than 
necessary to determine whether they are currently dangerous.”112 Once again, the 
Court considered Parliament’s use of more limited detention periods in other 
circumstances as evidence that the indeterminate detention imposed on these 
detainees did not minimally impair their Charter rights. 
Applying this same reasoning to the potential justification of the detention 
schemes introduced by Bills C-49, C-4, and C-31, it is clear that even if the 
Human Smugglers Act is geared toward a pressing and substantial objective that 
is rationally connected to the mandatory detentions,113 detaining some asylum 
seekers for 365 days without review, and without linking their potential release 
to a finding that ongoing detention is necessary, cannot be justified because it 
does not constitute a minimal impairment of their rights. As with Swain and 
Charkaoui, this is even more obviously the case when other arrivals are guaranteed 
review of their detention within 48 hours. 
It should again be noted that these concerns are even more acute in the 
detention regimes presented in Bills C-49 and C-4, where no allowance is made 
for designated foreign nationals who are children. Given previous precedent 
and common sense, it is inconceivable that a Canadian court would find the 
112. Swain, supra note 94 at para 148.
113. Although the Court has indicated that the rational connection analysis will not be overly 
rigorous, it is nonetheless arguable that justification of the Human Smugglers Act fails to meet 
this requirement. There is no data supporting the conclusion that mandatory detention will 
affect either the number of asylum seekers who seek refuge in Canada each year or the means 
through which they arrive. In addition, similar efforts in Australia were reversed after the 
government in that country acknowledged that “the evidence clearly shows [the measures] 
did not have any deterrent effect. In fact, there was an increase in the number of women and 
children making dangerous journeys to Australia.” See CCR, “Bill C-31,” supra note 82 at 10.
BOND, FAILURE TO REPORT 405
lengthy, unreviewable detention of a child justifiable in a situation where there is 
absolutely no evidence of a security threat or other potential harm.
Finally, it is also worth noting the observations of constitutional expert Peter 
Hogg that violations of the right not to be deprived of liberty except in accordance 
with principles of fundamental justice have never been successfully justified under 
section 1, and the right to be free from cruel and unusual treatment may be an 
absolute right, immune from any form of justification.114 This means that if Bills 
C-49, C-4, and C-31 are in violation of these particular rights, it is even more 
unlikely that the breaches are justifiable.
In sum, Bills C-49, C-4, and C-31 proposed a detention regime that exacerbates 
features already found to violate the Canadian Charter in several significant ways. 
First, the mandatory detention is not triggered by an individualized assessment. 
Second, the length of time before the detention is reviewable is over three times as 
long as the period previously found to be unacceptable. And third, individuals can 
be detained without ongoing consideration of any personalized circumstances. 
Thus while some aspects of the Human Smugglers Act may raise novel constitutional 
concerns subject to multiple interpretations, the detention scheme does not. Rather, 
it directly contradicts recent and clear direction provided by the Court in the 
much more complicated context of security certificate detainees: The Human 
Smugglers Act reflects a far greater infringement of the relevant Charter rights 
with far less basis for justification than did the scheme that was successfully 
challenged in Charkaoui. 
This is thus not a situation highlighting complexities relating to the 
Charter’s underdeterminacy—where application of judicial precedent involves 
reconciliation of competing authorities, or argument by analogy, or speculation 
about the reach of a particular principle. It is not even a situation where the 
balancing required by the justification analysis renders the outcome difficult to 
predict. Rather, the foregoing analysis demonstrates that the Human Smugglers 
Act is incapable of a credible and reasoned legal defence. Bills C-49, C-4, and 
C-31 are therefore manifestly unconstitutional according to the Department of 
Justice’s own definition of that term.
D. THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES OF INTRODUCING MANIFESTLY 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION
The Canadian government not only actively pursued passage of the unconstitutional 
Human Smugglers Act, it did so in an extremely public way. Two senior ministers 
114. Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law in Canada, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 38–49. 
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spoke regularly on the proposed legislation, issued frequent press releases, 
wrote editorials, and toured the country to host special events.115 Further, the 
anti-human smuggling agenda formed a key part of the Conservative party’s 
strategy in Canada’s 2011 federal election, and a variety of print and television 
advertisements from the campaign featured images of the Sun Sea and warned 
against “bogus claimants,” “illegal migrants,” and the dire consequences of weak 
border security.116 The focus on security was also evident in the Minister of Public 
Safety’s heavy involvement in promoting the Human Smugglers Act—a presence 
that reinforced the notion that the bill was designed to deal with serious security 
threats and was necessary to ensure the safety of Canada. 
The government’s strategy to generate fear around asylum seekers, 
particularly those arriving by boat, is neither new nor without political merit. 
Similar “anti-boat people” rhetoric has featured prominently in the campaigns 
of many successful politicians, but was particularly noteworthy, and particularly 
successful, during Australia’s “Tampa Affair.” In 2001, then Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard used the maritime arrival of 438 Afghans to brand asylum 
seekers arriving by boat as “illegal immigrants” who should not be allowed to set 
foot on Australian territory. The arrival of the Tampa, like that of the Sun Sea, 
generated intense media attention and precipitated (among other responses) the 
passage of a series of border protection statutes; increased interdiction methods 
designed to keep “boat people” from ever reaching Australian waters; and an 
elaborate diplomatic arrangement whereby various South Pacific countries agreed 
to accept and process asylum seekers in exchange for Australian aid money.117 The 
115. Jason Kenney was the Minister of Immigration, Citizenship, and Multiculturalism and 
Vic Toews was the Minister of Public Safety. The anti-human smuggling agenda features 
prominently on the websites of both ministries. See e.g. Public Safety Canada, News Release, 
“Government of Canada takes action to prevent human smugglers from abusing Canada’s 
immigration system” (16 June 2011), online: <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca>; Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada, News Release, “Government of Canada takes action to prevent 
human smugglers from abusing Canada’s immigration system” (16 June 2011), online: 
<http://www.cic.gc.ca>.
116. See e.g. Conservative Party of Canada, “Human Smuggling” (March 2011), online: YouTube 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dmN8BpD09AQ>.
117. For more on Australia’s “Pacific Solution,” see e.g. Penelope Mathew, “Australian Refugee 
Protection in the Wake of the Tampa” (2002) 96:3 AJIL 661; Sarah Macdonald, “Australia’s 
Pacific Solution,” BBC News (26 September 2002), online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>; 
Jennifer Pagonis, “UNHCR welcomes close of Australia’s Pacific Solution” (8 February 
2008), online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/47ac3f9c14.html>. The Australian High 
Court struck down the Pacific Solution on technical grounds. See Plaintiff M70/2011 v 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, [2011] HCA 32. A recent expert report led by 
Angus Houston recommended that a comparable scheme be re-implemented. See Angus 
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boat’s arrival also became a major political issue, and within days of the Tampa’s 
arrival, Howard’s Liberal party began running federal election ads very similar to 
those run by Harper’s Conservative party in 2011. In Australia, Howard himself 
campaigned heavily on an immigration slogan in the wake of the Tampa’s arrival: 
“We will decide who comes into this country and the circumstances in which 
they come.”118 
Significantly, John Howard’s hardline approach to the Tampa affair is viewed 
as a major political success: One week before the arrival of the boat, polls showed 
he was almost certainly going to lose the upcoming election;119 three months after 
its arrival he received a decisive renewed mandate.120 Commentators point to the 
fact that 77 per cent of Australians approved of his decision to turn away the 
Tampa as a major factor contributing to this stunning victory.121 
Polling released shortly after the arrival of the Sun Sea indicated that many 
Canadians also favoured rejection of the boat, with 60 per cent of those surveyed 
saying that the asylum seekers should be “turned away” and the vessel “escorted 
back to Sri Lanka.”122 The Canadian government used these figures to justify the 
introduction of the Human Smugglers Act, saying that “something must be done 
because after the arrival of migrant vessels … Canadians are losing faith in the 
Houston et al, “Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers” (June 2012), online: 
Australian Government <http://expertpanelonasylumseekers.dpmc.gov.au/report>.
118. Lateline, “Liberals accused of trying to rewrite history,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
(21 October 2001), online: <http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/>.
119. David Denemark, “Information flow and voter decision-making in the 2001 Australian 
federal election: The role of international and domestic issues,” (Paper delivered at the Jubilee 
conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association, Australian National University, 
October 2002), (2005) 58:3 Pol Research Quarterly 397.
120. John Howard’s Liberal/ National Coalition won 82 seats in the House of Representatives 
(out of a total of 150), while the second place Labour Party won 65 seats. This represents 
an increase of 2 seats for the government and a decrease of 2 seats for the opposition, as 
compared to the pre-election seat distribution in the House of Representatives. See Australian 
Electoral Commission, “Election 2001- House of Representatives: Divisions Won” (12 
December 2001), online: <http://results.aec.gov.au>. 
121. See e.g. “Australia and refugees: Election ahoy,” The Economist (6 September 2001), online: 
The Economist <http://www.economist.com>. The attacks of September 11th also aided the 
campaign of the Labour party and commentators note that Howard successfully linked the 
two issues, claiming that 9/11 confirmed the importance of the border security measures he 
had put in place as a result of the Tampa crisis. 
122. Brian Lilley, “Send Tamil migrants home: Poll: Majority don’t want boat to stay,” Toronto Sun 
(20 August 2010), online: <http://www.torontosun.com>. 
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refugee system.”123 Regardless of whether this was true, the government clearly 
viewed its “tough on smuggling” messaging as politically advantageous and thus 
worthy of loud publication.124 
In this context, the caveat in Grant Huscroft’s note 13 becomes important. 
Recall that there he anticipates that in certain situations a government may be 
“indifferent to the constitutional fate of its legislation” because there will be 
sufficient political advantage to proceeding irrespective of Charter concerns. 
Further, Huscroft explains that in these circumstances, politicians will also be 
able to benefit from criticizing the court for interfering with popular legislation.125 
I find Huscroft’s theory to be directly relevant to the introduction of Bills 
C-49, C-4, and C-31. Polls reporting a negative public reaction to the Sun Sea’s 
arrival combined with the very public response to this incident before, during, 
and after the election campaign suggest strongly that the government saw this 
issue as one from which it could derive significant political traction. It may also 
be relevant that outside the context of the Human Smugglers Act, senior ministers 
within Canada’s current government have publicly expressed both cynicism about 
the Charter’s potentially constraining effects126 and concern about the legitimacy 
123. Vic Toews, cited in Sunny Dhillon, “Canadians ‘hardening’ on refugee process, Vic Toews 
says,” The Globe and Mail (20 January 2011), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>. 
Critics cited in the same article argue that government rhetoric about refugees must be 
blamed for any hardening of Canadian opinion on this subject. 
124. For characterizations of the introduction of the Human Smugglers Act as a “political wedge” 
aimed at creating divisive and harmful policy, see for e.g. Errol Mendes, “Human Smuggling 
Bill Just a Political Game,” The Huffington Post Canada (28 September 2011), online: <http://
www.huffingtonpost.ca>; Peter Showler, “Revenge of the Majority: Immigration and Refugee 
Policy in the Fall Parliament,” Embassy Magazine (14 September 2011), online: University 
of Ottawa Human Rights Research and Education Centre <http://www.cdp-hrc.uottawa.ca/
projects/refugee-forum/documents/RevengeoftheMajority.pdf>. Similar observations have 
been made with respect to John Howard’s approach in Australia, and Ian Ward’s account of 
that situation represents a particularly interesting example. Ward argues that failure of the 
Australian media to recognize the Tampa incident as one of wedge politics ultimately aided 
Howard’s divisive agenda, as the story was consistently covered as one dealing exclusively 
with “illegal immigrants” and border security. See Ian Ward, “The Tampa, wedge politics, and 
a lesson for political journalism” (July 2002) 24:1 Australian Journalism Rev 21. 
125. Huscroft, “Reconciling Duty,” supra note 16 at 780, n 13.
126. Including in statements by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration with regard to 
an announcement that women who wear face coverings will be required to remove them 
during citizenship ceremonies. When questioned about potential constitutional objections 
to the ban on the basis of freedom of religion, Minister Kenney stated: “I’m sure they’ll 
trump up some stupid Charter of Rights challenge.” See Kim Mackrael & Les Perreaux, 
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of courts reviewing legislation for constitutional compliance.127 The government 
is therefore well positioned from an ideological perspective to criticize a court 
that strikes down any of its politically popular legislation. Introduction of the 
Human Smugglers Act thus appears to map perfectly onto all of the factors in 
Huscroft’s note 13—a mapping which provides a persuasive explanation of why 
political considerations failed to ensure that the government did not “introduce 
a bill that appears to be inconsistent with Charter case law.”128
It is far more difficult to understand why introduction of the Human Smugglers 
Act did not yield a section 4.1 report. Section 4.1 promises to alert Canadians 
when the government is introducing legislation that is blatantly in violation of the 
Charter, and should be immune from the political considerations that might 
encourage a government to proceed even in the face of serious constitutional 
concerns. In fact, these are precisely the situations in which section 4.1 can and 
should play the most significant role, since a government’s decision to proceed 
with legislation notwithstanding obvious Charter violations should be the 
subject of public scrutiny and debate. If even bills containing the most blatant 
constitutional deficiencies are insufficient to trigger a report, the accountability 
mechanism that this process aims to provide has failed. Proof of this failure 
is unfortunately evident in the lack of a section 4.1 report accompanying Bill 
C-49, C-4, or C-31. As the following section explains, this failure to provide 
accountability does not mean that the reporting mechanism is not being put 
to use for other purposes.
III. THE SHIFT FROM GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY TO 
POLITICAL COVER
When the Human Smugglers Act was introduced, some commentators stated 
publicly that it was “inconceivable” that the senior politicians advancing its 
“Muslim Women Must Show Faces When Taking Citizenship Oath,” The Globe and Mail (12 
December 2011), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/>.
127. Perhaps most famously, Prime Minister Stephen Harper has said that “Yes, I share many of 
the concerns of my colleagues and allies about biased ‘judicial activism’ and its extremes. 
I agree that serious flaws exist in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that there is no 
meaningful review or accountability mechanisms for Supreme Court justices.” See Kirk 
Makin, “The coming conservative court: Harper to reshape judiciary,” The Globe and Mail 
(13 May 2011), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/>.
128. Huscroft, “Reconciling Duty,” supra note 16 at 780. 
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introduction were unaware of its blatant constitutional deficiencies.129 They 
criticized the government for manipulating the electorate through the deliberate 
introduction of unlawful legislation, alleging that doing so was an “affront to the 
rule of law” and an “insult to Canadians.”130 Indeed, despite dozens of editorial 
and news pieces discussing the bill’s lack of Charter compliance, not a single 
expert publicly defended its constitutional status. Even a prominent member 
of the Conservative party and supporter of many aspects of the proposals noted 
that given precedent, it is “inconceivable that the Court would permit the 
automatic detention of smuggled migrants without review for a year.”131 Many 
witnesses testifying before the House Standing Committee on Citizenship and 
Immigration during study of Bill C-31 expressed similar sentiments, and at 
least two individuals generally supportive of the bill testified that the detention 
provisions were likely to fail on Charter grounds.132 Nonetheless, both of the senior 
government ministers promoting the Human Smugglers Act continued to declare 
confidence in its constitutionality, with Minister Kenney stating repeatedly that 
the government was “absolutely certain that this meets our international and 
domestic legal obligations.”133
Despite this unequivocal assertion, details underlying the government’s legal 
position on the constitutionality of the Human Smugglers Act have never been 
made public and government comments about Charter compliance are almost 
completely absent from the record. A review of statements by Conservative MPs 
before the committee considering Bill C-31, and in the House of Commons during 
debate on each of Bills C-49, C-4, and C-31, reveals a total of nine government 
references to the Charter. None of these statements addresses Charkaoui or 
129. Audrey Macklin & Sean Rehaag, “Playing politics with refugees,” Toronto Star (3 December 
2010), online: <http://www.thestar.com>.
130. Ibid. 
131. Benjamin Perrin, “Benjamin Perrin: A better plan to stop migrant smuggling,” National Post 
(14 November 2011), online: <http://www.nationalpost.com>. Professor Perrin subsequently 
took a leave of absence to serve as special advisor to Prime Minister Harper on a variety of 
issues, including citizenship and immigration. See UBC Law, “Benjamin Perrin,” online: 
<http://www.law.ubc.ca/faculty/Perrin/>.
132. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, 
No 37 (2 May 2012) at 1700 (Chantal Desloges). See also House of Commons, Standing 
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 38 (3 May 2012) at 0900 
(James Bissett).
133. See e.g. CTV.ca News Staff, “Smuggling bill would survive Charter challenge: Kenney,” CTV.
ca (24 October 2010), online: <http://www.ctv.ca>. See also Meagan Fitzpatrick, “Human 
Smuggling Bill Makes a Return,” CBC News (16 June 2011), online: <http://www.cbc.ca> 
(where Minister Vic Toews is quoted saying, “I’m confident that the measures are Charter 
compliant”).
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otherwise provides a substantive explanation of the grounds on which the 
government believed the Human Smugglers Act to be Charter compliant.134 This 
is in stark contrast with opposition statements, in which Charter concerns appear 
over one hundred times, and frequently contain reference to specific provisions 
and alleged violations. The Charkaoui decision is also mentioned explicitly on 
multiple occasions, although demands that the government reconcile this case 
with the Human Smugglers Act went repeatedly unanswered, both in the House 
of Commons and in committee.135
 There are three notable exceptions to the government’s general refusal to 
discuss the relationship between the Human Smugglers Act and the Charter as part 
of the legislative debate. Each of these is discussed briefly below.
First, on 27 March 2012, Minister Kenney appeared before the House of 
Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration to discuss 
annual budget estimates. In response to a question by New Democrat MP Don 
Davies about the potential cost of defending the Human Smugglers Act in court, 
Minister Kenney reiterated that the government believed the legislation was 
Charter compliant. When pushed for further explanation in light of Charkaoui, 
he went on to explain that “[w]e believe there is a compelling policy objective 
in ensuring that we have identified illegal and irregular migrants … [and that] 
there is a compelling security rationale for maintaining immigration detention 
for such individuals until we have identified who they are.”136 This reference to 
a potential justification under section 1 of the Charter is obviously incomplete 
(and addresses only the first stage of the Oakes framework), but it is the most 
comprehensive explanation that has been provided by the government on the 
constitutionality of its proposals.
The second notable exchange regarding Charter compliance occurred during 
debates on Bill C-49, when Liberal MP Gerry Byrne asked to see the Department 
of Justice opinion finding the bill consistent with the Charter:
134. House of Commons Debates on Bills C-49, C-4, and C-31 were searched, as was the 
evidence of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration’s 
study of Bill C-31. The number of government references to the Charter from all these 
sources totaled 9: 3 for each of C-49; C-4; and C-31.
135. Results derived from electronic searches of the House of Commons Debates on Bills C-49, 
C-4, and C-31, as well as searches in the evidence of the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration’s study of Bill C-31. The number of opposition 
party references to the Charter from all of these sources totaled 105: 12 for C-49; 63 for C-4; 
and 30 for C-31. Opposition members specifically mentioned the Charkaoui case on at least 
12 distinct occasions during the Committee’s study of the Bill.
136. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, 
No 29 (27 March 2012) at 1650 (Hon Jason Kenney).
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Mr. Speaker, the government attempts to create fairness, and one of the great mediators 
of fairness is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Would the parliamentary 
secretary be prepared to table in the House an opinion by the Department of Justice 
as to whether or not all provisions within this bill will meet the test of the Charter 
or a Charter challenge?
Would he provide that to members of the House, so that we can review as to 
whether or not these provisions do indeed meet the test of fairness as prescribed 
by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?137 
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety responded 
as follows:
Mr. Speaker, my colleague across the floor would know that I do not have such a 
document with me. Whether it exists or not, I do not know, but that is frequently an 
argument we hear from the opposite side, that it will not pass the test of the Charter.
We can always stand back and say it will not pass the test of the Charter, and we will 
not know that until a court has ruled on it. However, as he knows from when his 
party was in power, the drafters of these bills come from within the legal branches of 
Justice and other branches. They have vetted it. They have brought it forward. This 
bill was not written on the back of a napkin or anything of that nature. It has been 
drafted properly, and I am sure my colleague is quite well aware of that.138
It is significant to note that this response allowed the government to rely on 
the authority associated with the Department of Justice’s legal opinion, while 
simultaneously avoiding any meaningful discussion about the potential Charter 
inconsistencies in its proposed legislation. By declaring that the bill had been 
properly contemplated and vetted by experts, the government was able to both 
legitimize its position and shield itself from critiques on constitutional grounds 
without providing any details on the substance of its position.
A similar tactic was used in committee during consideration of Bill C-31. 
When asked directly by Liberal MP Kevin Lamoureux whether “the government 
is prepared to share any legal opinion with the committee membership that would 
suggest [the bill] is in compliance [with the Charter], or any legal opinion they 
have in regard to the mandatory detention issue,” he was reminded by government 
MP David Tilson of earlier testimony by Department of Justice lawyer Scott 
137. House of Commons Debates, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 39 (28 October 2010) at 1035 (Hon 
Gerry Byrne). 
138. Ibid at 1040 (Dave MacKenzie).
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Nesbitt, which indicated that “in fact the legislation is Charter compliant.”139 
Review of the transcript, however, reveals that Mr. Nesbitt did not provide any 
specifics about the relevant Charter opinion, instead only vaguely referencing the 
government’s belief that courts will consider both the “operational context” the 
government faces in situations of irregular arrivals and the “important objectives 
the bill is trying to achieve.” 140 He also referred to the fact that mandatory detention 
only follows designation, and that the latter is triggered in situations where it is “truly 
needed.”141 When confronted with requests for more specific information about 
the constitutional status of the bill, including the applicability of Charkaoui, Mr. 
Nesbitt declined to provide further comment, instead reminding the committee 
that since section 4.1 requires an examination of “every government bill that’s 
presented in the House to ensure it’s consistent with the purposes and provisions 
of the Charter … this bill wouldn’t be before committee today had the Minister 
of Justice [found] … that the bill was not consistent.”142 He went on to explain 
that he was unable to provide details of the opinion on which this decision was 
based because “advice the department has provided is privileged.”143 
Although Mr. Nesbitt was correct to note that as the government’s lawyer he 
was precluded from disclosing details of advice given to his client,144 MP Kevin 
Lamoureux was likewise correct when he pointed out later in the day that the 
government, as client, could waive the solicitor-client privilege and provide the 
committee with the relevant legal documents, either in camera or in public. In 
response to Lamoreux’s request that this occur, Conservative MP and Committee 
Chair David Tilson noted that such a thing had “never happened.” He further 
doubted that “it ever will happen under my observation.”145 Mr. Nesbitt’s 
misleading assertion that government bills are vetted to ensure consistency with 
the Charter (as opposed to testing for “manifest unconstitutionality”) was never 
revisited or corrected.
This mischaracterization of the vetting threshold and the corresponding 
avoidance of substantive engagement with Charter issues are also evident in 
correspondence from Minister Kenney’s office. The following exchange regarding 
139. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, 
No 44 (10 May 2012) at 0950. 
140. Ibid at 935 (Scott Nesbitt).
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid at 0940.
143. Ibid at 0945. 
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid at 0955 (David Tilson).
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the constitutionality of the Human Smugglers Act occurred between a journalist 
and Minister Kenney’s press secretary:
Kristen Shane, Associate Editor, Embassy Magazine:
I’m writing a story … regarding the creation of a new group: the Canadian Association 
of Refugee Lawyers Executive members have told me that part of the impetus for 
starting the group was C-49/C-4, the Preventing Human Smuggling bill. 
They say there are problems with it that make it unconstitutional. Primarily regarding 
the one-year automatic detention without judicial review. They say it violates Section 
7 of the Charter, which says everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
the person. 
…
My questions for you: How do you respond to their claims that C-4 is unconstitution-
al? That the one-year detention without judicial review violates Section 7?
…
Candice Malcolm, Minister Kenney’s Press Secretary:
Kristen,
Page 721 of the Second Edition of House of Commons Procedure and Practice 
O’Brien and Bosc states: “The Minister of Justice is required to examine every bill 
introduced by a Minister in order to ascertain that it is consistent with the Canadian 
Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.” 
Canada’s immigration system is being abused by human smugglers who illegally 
bring migrants into Canada. Our government has received a strong mandate from 
Canadians to take action to prevent this abuse and maintain the integrity of our 
borders and Canadian citizenship. Canada opens its doors to those who work hard 
and play by the rules. However we must crack down on those who seek to take 
advantage of our generosity, often for financial gain.
Bill C-4 the Prevent Human Smugglers from Abusing Canada’s Immigration System 
Act will work to deter and prevent human smugglers from targeting Canada. There 
are thousands of immigrants patiently waiting to start a better life in Canada; it 
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is fundamentally unfair to legitimate refugees for human smuggling operations to 
jump the queue.
It is vital that Parliament pass this legislation, and we encourage the opposition to 
listen to Canadians and stop delaying the passing of this legislation.
Kind regards… .146
While the initial inquiry from the journalist has been truncated here, the 
entire text from Minister Kenney’s office is reproduced. Three familiar features of 
this exchange are particularly noteworthy. First, the reporter’s question about a 
Charter violation arising from a particular aspect of the new legislation is answered 
with a direct reference to the section 4.1 reporting requirement. Second, the 
nature of the vetting process is once again significantly mischaracterized through 
reference to a finding of “consistency” with the Charter, rather than “inconsistency” 
or “manifest unconstitutionality.” While this statement is an accurate quotation 
from the procedure manual mentioned, it is not at all reflective of the actual 
inquiry that is undertaken by government lawyers under section 4.1.147 And 
third, while a number of points are raised in favour of the Human Smugglers 
Act, engagement with the substantive Charter issues that are mentioned in the 
journalist’s initial email is completely absent. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that while section 4.1 was introduced 
to promote government accountability in the face of Canada’s human rights 
instruments, it is instead becoming a convenient form of political cover. When 
government representatives were faced with difficult constitutional critiques of 
the Human Smugglers Act, they used section 4.1 to invoke the legitimacy attached 
to review by Department of Justice lawyers while simultaneously avoiding any 
146. Email exchange between Kristen Shane and Candice Malcolm (September 26-28, 2011) [on 
file with author].
147. See “Drafting Bills” in Audrey O’Brien & Marc Bosc, eds, House of Commons Procedure 
and Practice, 2d ed (2009), online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/
procedure-book-livre/Document.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&sbdid=DA2AC62F-BB39-
4E5F-9F7D-90BA3496D0A6&sbpid=1E3A6719-B291-4B7D-B13B-52819E50CE14> 
[Procedure Manual]; Government of Canada Privy Council Office, Guide to Making Federal 
Acts and Regulations, 2d ed (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2001) at 155, 
online: Government of Canada <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/information/publications/
legislation/pdf-eng.pdf> [Guide to Making Federal Acts and Regulations]. While the Procedural 
Manual refers to the need for verification of “consistency” with the Charter and the Bill of 
Rights, the Guide to Making Federal Acts and Regulations, to which the Procedure Manual 
refers, more accurately refers to a check for “inconsistency.” Neither source refers to the 
“manifestly unconstitutional” threshold that is being applied.
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substantive engagement with Charter issues. Repeated misrepresentation of the 
threshold used during the section 4.1 vetting process further strengthened the 
impact of this technique. The result is a Canadian public that was both misled 
about the scrutiny to which Bills C-49, C-4, and C-31 were subjected and 
denied access to meaningful Charter debate.148 Thus, rather than increasing 
accountability, section 4.1 contributed to a significant democratic deficit149 and 
decreased legitimacy.150 
IV. BEYOND THE HUMAN SMUGGLERS ACT 
A. DIFFERENT BILLS; FAMILIAR TECHNIQUES
The Human Smugglers Act provides an important test for the effectiveness of the 
section 4.1 accountability mechanism because its proposed detention scheme 
runs so clearly contrary to recent and conclusive judicial precedent. The issues 
it demonstrates are not, however, anomalous. In November 2009, a Globe and 
Mail article referred to the reporting requirement and noted that “cautious 
148. See Hon Irwin Cotler, “Keynote Address” (Lecture delivered at the 2011 Osgoode Hall 
Constitutional Cases Conference, Toronto, 4 May 2012) [unpublished]. Opposition MP 
and former Attorney General Irwin Cotler supported this interpretation of the government’s 
use of s 4.1 to avoid meaningful debate. He added that the fact s 4.1 is limited to bills 
introduced by government also allows the entire review process to be circumvented through 
the use of private members bills. This latter point was also the subject of a media story 
that noted the government’s support of a variety of private members bills that were being 
introduced by members of its own party. See Tonda MacCharles, “Private member’s bills cut 
corners on lawmaking, say critics,” The Toronto Star (10 May 2012), online: <http://www.
thestar.com>. 
149. Peter Aucoin & Lori Turnbull, “The Democratic Deficit: Paul Martin and Parliamentary 
Reform” (2003) 46:4 Can Pub Adm 427. This term refers generally to “the gap between what 
Canadians expect of their political institutions in terms of democratic governance and what 
they perceive as reality,” and has been used to describe a “wide range of current democratic 
discontents” (ibid at 428, 436). See also Richard Devlin et al, “Reducing the Democratic 
Deficit: Representation, Diversity and the Canadian Judiciary, or Towards a ‘Triple P’ 
Judiciary” (2000) 38:3 Alta L Rev 734; Katherine A Graham & Susan D Phillips, “Citizen 
engagement: beyond the customer revolution” (1997) 40:2 Can Pub Adm 255; Patti Tamara 
Lenard & Richard Simeon, eds, Imperfect Democracies: The Democratic Deficit in Canada and 
the United States (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012).
150. Graham and Phillips have observed generally that 
[m]any of the measures implemented over the past decade intended to enhance democracy, 
such as major public consultations and decentralization of policy responsibilities to increas-
ingly local levels, have not produced the desired results. Indeed, in many cases, they have 
contributed to decreased legitimacy of political institutions.
 See Graham & Phillips, supra note 150 at 255-56.
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vetting is no longer the norm.”151 The article cites an anonymous source within 
the Department of Justice who states that the government’s preoccupation with 
fulfilling certain policy objectives has made it willing to sign section 4.1 
certificates “despite stern internal warning that [the attached bill] would likely 
violate Charter provisions.” The source also notes that the reason for “barrel[ing] 
ahead” despite these warnings is perceived political advantage: “They made a 
lot of campaign promises that were either ill advised or not workable … [t]hen, 
when they came into power, they were hell-bent on making them happen.”152 
The Globe and Mail article containing these statements was written in response 
to several bills introducing controversial crime legislation,153 none of which 
triggered a section 4.1 report. 
The federal government has also invoked the reporting requirement to avoid 
meaningful constitutional debate outside the context of the Human Smugglers 
Act, and this practice was particularly pronounced during committee meetings 
relating to the Tackling Violent Crime Act.154 Like the Human Smugglers Act, 
the Tackling Violent Crime Act contained a number of controversial provisions 
that were subject to criticism on both ideological and constitutional grounds.155 
When the Minister of Justice appeared before the committee to support the 
bill, he informed committee members that his department “is very careful 
in terms of making sure that legislation, to the extent that we are able to 
predict these things, will withstand a challenge under the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.”156 He then explicitly invoked the legitimacy associated with review 
by the Department of Justice: 
So it’s not just me; the people in the Department of Justice who are experts in this area 
take their responsibility very seriously. So yes, they draft every piece of legislation, every 
line, every clause, with a view to ensuring to the greatest extent possible that these will 
withstand constitutional challenge.157
151. Kirk Makin, “Canadian Crime and American Punishment,” The Globe and Mail (27 
November 2009), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>. 
152. Ibid. 
153. Ibid. 
154. Bill C-2, supra note 28. This was an omnibus bill that included amendments to dangerous 
offenders legislation that were previously introduced (but not passed due to prorogation of 
the House). See Bill C-27, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Dangerous Offenders and 
Recognizance to Keep the Peace), 1st Sess, 39th Parl, 2007. 
155. But unlike the Human Smugglers Act, the alleged violations did not run directly contrary to 
recent and directly applicable authority from the Court. 
156. House of Commons, Legislative Committee on Bill C-2, 39th Parl, 2nd Sess, No 002 (30 
October 2007) at 1700 (Hon Rob Nicholson).
157. Ibid.
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The minister did not provide any details about why he or the Department 
of Justice had concluded that the legislation was “fully constitutional,” instead 
reiterating only that he had “carefully considered” the Charter.158 
Despite these assurances, committee members were concerned when nine 
of twelve constitutional experts testified that the bill’s reverse onus provision 
likely violated the Charter’s guarantees of presumption of innocence. Opposition 
members began to demand more information regarding the government’s Charter 
assessment and a motion was eventually tabled requesting that the Department 
of Justice provide the committee with all relevant legal opinions relating to the 
constitutionality of the bill “on a confidential, in camera basis which protects 
‘advice to the Minister.’”159 
Speaking in support of the motion, Liberal MP Réal Ménard stated:
Before voting on a bill, we have the responsibility of ensuring that we have all the 
information. Nine witnesses have told us this bill was not constitutional. I feel I am 
doing my job as a member of Parliament when I ask for information… .
Why do we not have faith in the word of members of Parliament? [The motion says] 
that we would keep this information confidential. Is this not paid for with public 
funds? ... Is it unreasonable, as an elected official, to vote on a bill nine witnesses said 
was unconstitutional? Is it unreasonable to ask if this was investigated? 
If the minister said so, that is not enough. We need more information … . I expect 
officials who have knowledge of constitutional law, who provided opinions to the 
minister, who are not from the private sector, who are paid with public funds, to 
give us that information.160 
The government’s parliamentary secretary responded to the concerns in two 
ways: First, he reminded committee members that the minister had an obligation 
to certify bills only when “he believes the bills to be constitutional based on advice 
he receives” and that in this case the minister felt the proposed legislation was 
“compliant with the Charter of Rights”; and second, he confirmed that advice 
received by the minister on the issue of constitutionality is subject to solicitor-client 
158. Ibid at 1645 (Hon Rob Nicholson).
159. The motion was tabled by Réal Ménard and subject to friendly amendment by Marlene 
Jennings. The amended motion read as follows: “That the Department of Justice be asked on 
a confidential, in-camera basis which protects ‘advice to the Minister’ to table all available 
legal opinions in its possession relating to the constitutionality of Bill C 2 by Friday, 
November 16, 2007, 3.00pm.” See House of Commons, Legislative Committee on Bill C-2, 
“Minutes of Proceedings,” 39th Parl, 2nd Sess, No 007 (15 November 2007).
160. Ibid at 0915 (Réal Ménard). 
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privilege and thus cannot be provided.161 When opposition members pointed out 
that the privilege could be waived,162 Mr. Moore stated simply that this “would 
not happen.”163 The motion to require the minister to produce more information 
on his Charter opinion was eventually defeated by one vote.164 
The widespread and systemic nature of the government’s practices relating 
to the reporting requirement also became the subject of an extraordinary legal 
challenge while this article was being prepared for publication. In December 
2012, Department of Justice lawyer Edgar Schmidt began a proceeding in 
Federal Court seeking a declaration that the Department has not been fulfilling 
its reporting obligations under the Department of Justice Act and the Bill of 
Rights. According to Schmidt, “the interpretation, practice and directions [of 
the Department of Justice] … have unlawfully transformed the examinations 
under the statutory examination provisions.”165 In particular, Schmidt contends 
that while the reporting requirements necessitate an examination focused on 
whether a proposed bill is consistent with Canada’s human rights instruments, 
the examination actually undertaken by the Department of Justice is instead 
improperly “focused on the core question of whether there is any possibility (even 
if the possibility is very slender) that a proposed bill or regulation is consistent 
with the Bill of Rights and Charter.”166
Documents filed in relation to the Schmidt case reveal that the Department 
of Justice is currently assessing the risk associated with Charter compliance on 
a five-point scale, ranging from “very low” (0–20 per cent risk—likelihood of a 
successful challenge to the measure is “remote”) to “very high” (81–100 per cent 
risk—likelihood of a successful challenge to the measure is “almost certain”).167 
161. Ibid at 0905-0915 (Réal Ménard). 
162. Ibid at 0910-0915 (Hon Marlene Jennings).
163. Ibid at 0905 (Rob Moore).
164. Ibid at 0925. Bill C-2 came into force in stages in May and July 2008. It has since been the 
subject of numerous Charter challenges on a variety of grounds. See e.g. R v Powichrowski, 
2009 ONCJ 490, 70 CR (6th) 376; R v Fremlin, 2012 ONSC 888, 254 CRR (2d) 202; 
R v Nur, 2011 ONSC 4874, 275 CCC (3d) 330; R v Jaycox, 2010 BCPC 140, 215 CRR 
(2d) 61; R v MacAuley, 2010 BCPC 248, [2010] BCJ No 1941 (QL); R v Randhawa, 2010 
Carswell Ont 10426 (WL Can)(Ct J)). Of particular interest is R v Jaycox, which was granted 
leave at the British Columbia Court of Appeal in February 2012 after the British Columbia 
Supreme Court reversed a Provincial Court finding that expanded police powers violated ss 8 
and 10(b) of the Charter. See R v Jaycox, 2012 BCCA 68, 316 BCAC 209.
165. Schmidt v Canada (Attorney General) (ongoing), T-2225-12 (Plaintiff Statement of Claim at 
para 18) (FCTD) [Schmidt].
166. Ibid [emphasis added].
167. Schmidt, supra note 165 (Documents produced by Defendant upon Motion, Appendix C, 
Extracts from Effective Communication of Legal Risk at 12-13). 
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They also explain that the reporting requirement is only triggered “at the far end 
of the fifth range [very high] and is due to manifest inconsistency between the 
proposed legislation and the Charter. In such cases … no credible (ie. reasonable 
and bona fide) argument exists in support of it… .”168 Schmidt’s own statement of 
claim elaborates further on how this threshold is currently being applied:
[I]f it is the opinion of counsel in the Department that a provision is likely or even almost 
certainly inconsistent with the [Charter or Bill of Rights]—even if the probability of 
inconsistency is 95% or more—, but some argument can reasonably be made in favour 
of its consistency—even if all arguments in favour of its consistency have a combined 
likelihood of success of 5% or less—, no advice is given to the Minister that he or 
she— unless he or she forms a different opinion—has a duty to report to the House 
of Commons about that provision and therefore no report is made to that House.169
In March 2013, Justice Noël ordered the federal government to pay Schmidt’s 
legal costs, noting that the proceeding raises issues that are “prima facie meritorious, 
of public importance and have not been resolved in previous cases.”170 At the time 
of writing, the merits of Schmidt’s case have not yet been heard.171 
Edgar Schmidt’s stunning legal challenge thrust the issue of section 4.1 
reporting into the public sphere172 and onto the floor of the House of Commons. 
On 6 March 2013, New Democratic Party MP Pat Martin raised a question of 
privilege, claiming that if Schmidt’s allegations about the vetting threshold are 
correct, the privilege of all MPs to be reassured that bills are not in violation of 
the Charter or the Bill of Rights has been breached. Martin stated that:
168. Ibid.
169. Schmidt, supra note 166 (Plaintiff Statement of Claim at para 13). 
170. Schmidt v Canada (Attorney General), [2013] FCJ No 289 at paras 5-6. Justice Noël also 
noted that Mr. Schmidt has no personal benefit to gain from the proceeding.
171. Bill Curry, “Judge raps Justice officials for treatment of whistle-blower,” The Globe and Mail 
(16 January 2013), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/>. The day after launching 
his legal proceeding, Schmidt was suspended without pay “for violating his duties as a lawyer 
and public servant.” At a hearing on 15 January 2013, Justice Noël criticized the suspension, 
calling it “unbelievable” and condemning the Department for doing “everything it could 
to kill [the legal proceeding].” Schmidt’s employment issues have since been settled out of 
court and he is now retired from the federal public service. See Schmidt’s website, Edward 
Schmidt, “Blog” (19 December 2013), online: CharterDefence.ca <http://charterdefence.ca/
blog.html>.
172. See e.g. Kim Mackrael, “Justice Minister says ‘no question’ reforms will pass Charter test,” 
The Globe and Mail (18 March 2013), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/>; Laura 
Stone, “Government whistleblower just doing ‘the right thing,’” Global News (3 April 2013), 
online: <http://globalnews.ca/>.
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[failure in this regard] hinders us as members of Parliament in the performance of 
our parliamentary duties. It constitutes an interference in the performance of our 
duties to exercise due diligence of the bills before us. I believe every member of the 
House would agree that if these allegations are proven to be true, they show 
contempt for the authority and dignity of Parliament.173
The Speaker of the House declined to comment on the adequacy of the 
government’s approach to the vetting process, however, finding that questions of 
a legal or constitutional nature are beyond the scope of his mandate.174 
The issue was raised again on 17 June 2013 when Liberal MP Irwin 
Cotler introduced Bill C-537: the Constitutional Compliance Review Act.175 The 
bill proposed giving the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel of the House 
of Commons and Senate responsibility for vetting all proposed legislation for 
constitutional compliance. It further specified that a report should be submitted 
when it is deemed “likely” that any of a bill’s provisions are inconsistent with 
the purposes or provisions of the Bill of Rights or the Constitution Acts, 1867 to 
1982.176 Bill C-537 died on the order paper when Parliament was prorogued 
in September 2013. Details of the section 4.1 reporting requirement therefore 
remain unchanged. 
B. THE NEED TO RECOGNIZE FAILURE 
As my study of the Human Smugglers Act has demonstrated, section 4.1 of the 
Department of Justice Act is not only failing its mandate to provide accountability 
through reports of inconsistency, it is also providing the government with political 
cover when it wishes to avoid substantive critique on Charter grounds. The ultimate 
result is not only a lack of report in situations of egregious Charter violation, but 
also impoverished constitutional debate and a significant democratic deficit. 
The remedy for this is not, however, simply to repeal section 4.1 of the 
Department of Justice Act and forget about the reporting requirement in its 
entirety. Despite recent comments that the government is prepared to knowingly 
“barrel ahead” with unconstitutional legislation, the vetting process ensures that 
the human rights implications of new legislation are at least considered before a 
173. House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 220 (6 March 2013) at 1710 (Pat Martin).
174. House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 230 (27 March 2013) at 1600-
 1620 (Hon Andrew Scheer).
175. Bill C-537, An Act to ensure legislative compliance with the Canadian Bill of Rights and the 
Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1st 
Sess, 41st Parl, 2013 (first reading 17 June 2013).
176. Ibid, cl 6(2).
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government bill is introduced. Further, the internal correction model very likely 
ensures that at least some Charter concerns—particularly those that are neither 
deliberate nor necessary to fulfill a particular government policy—continue to 
be remedied prior to tabling in the House of Commons. The reporting aspect of 
the process incentivizes identifying and correcting these errors before the bills are 
subjected to public scrutiny. 
The potential value of an effective reporting requirement is also evidenced 
elsewhere, where public reports on the human rights consequences of legislation 
encourage, rather than stifle, meaningful public debate. Both the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand, for example, have processes through which proposed 
legislation is subjected to genuine scrutiny for human rights concerns, with 
results being made available not only to politicians debating the proposals, but 
also the general public.177 In the United Kingdom, this assessment is performed 
by the Joint Committee on Human Rights (a Parliamentary Committee), 
which considers government and private Members’ bills for their human rights 
implications. The Chairman and Legal Advisor consider all bills and report those 
that seem to have significant human rights implications to the committee as a 
whole, which then undertakes more focused scrutiny. Private members’ bills are 
considered only where they both raise significant human rights issues and appear 
likely to become law.178 In New Zealand, legislative scrutiny is performed by the 
Ministry of Justice and the Crown Law Office. The Attorney General is required 
to notify the House of Representatives of any government bill that is deemed to be 
inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights at the time of its introduction. In the 
case of private Members’ bills, the report must be made as soon as is practicable.179 
The process of publicizing legal opinions is more discretionary in the United 
States, but the Attorney General’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) “operates from 
the presumption that it should make its significant opinions [including those dealing 
with the constitutional compliance of proposed legislation] fully and promptly 
available to the public” in order to encourage “transparency,” “accountability,” and 
177. For interesting comparative work, especially between Canada and New Zealand, see Janet 
L Hiebert, “Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model” (2006) 69:1 Mod L Rev 
7 [Hiebert, “Parliamentary Bills of Rights”]; Hiebert, “Rights-Vetting,” supra note 16; 
Huscroft, “Reconciling Duty,” supra note 16.
178. UK, House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, The 
Committee’s Future Working Practices (Twenty-third Report of Session 2005-06) (London: 
The Stationery Office Limited, 2006) at 12-13, online: Parliament of the United Kingdom 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200506/jtselect/jtrights/239/239.pdf>.
179. New Zealand Ministry of Justice, “Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act,” online: 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz>.
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“public confidence in the legality of government action.”180 The OLC has also 
published details about how its legal opinions are prepared and what factors 
are relevant to a decision not to disclose.181 Although the processes in these 
countries vary significantly, all have resulted in the identification of numerous 
issues of concern that were subsequently considered and openly debated as part 
of the legislative process.182 
A variety of proposals for reform have been made in the Canadian context. 
Commentators have suggested separating the offices of the Attorney General 
(AG) and the Minister of Justice (and making the AG responsible for government 
litigation and constitutional advice, while the Minister of Justice would be 
responsible for legal policy);183 giving greater independence to the Minister 
180. US Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, “Memorandum for Attorneys of the 
Office: Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinion” (16 July 2010) at 5, 
online: <http://www.justice.gov/olc/pdf/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf>.
181. Ibid. 
182. Reports issued by the Joint Select Committee on Human Rights of the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom can be found online. See Joint Select Committee, “Joint Committee on 
Human Rights – publications,” online: Parliament of the United Kingdom <http://www.
parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-committee/
Publications/>. Reports issued by the New Zealand Ministry of Justice are published 
online. See Ministry of Justice, “Section 7 reports,” online: New Zealand Ministry 
of Justice <http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy/constitutional-law-and-human-rights/
human-rights/domestic-human-rights-protection/about-the-new-zealand-bill-of-rights-act/
advising-the-attorney-general/section-7-reports-published-before-august-2002/section-7-
reports-published-before-august-2002>. In addition, since 2003, the government of New 
Zealand has voluntarily made the advice provided to its Attorney General available on the 
Ministry of Justice website. See Andrew Geddis, “The Comparative Irrelevance of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act to Legislative Practice” (2009) 23:4 NZUL Rev 465 at 474; 
Carolyn Archer, “Section 7 of the Bill of Rights Act” (2004) NZLJ 320 at 320. Opinions 
of the United States Attorney General on questions of law rendered upon request of the 
President or the head of an Executive Branch department are officially released and published 
online. See “Opinions” (February 2013), online: The United States Department of Justice 
<http://www.justice.gov/olc/opinions.html>. Those opinions that have not been selected for 
official release, but which the Office of Legal Counsel has released as a matter of discretion, 
are published online. See “OLC FOIA Reading Room” (January 2014), online: The United 
States Department of Justice <http://www.justice.gov/olc/olc-foia1.htm>. While approaches 
across these countries vary, it is noteworthy that they are all considerably more open than 
that in place in Canada, where Charter opinions are not provided (to either the public or 
MPs) under any circumstances.
183. James B Kelly & Matthew A Hennigar, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and the minister 
of justice: Weak-form review within a constitutional Charter of Rights” (2012) 10:1 Int’l J 
Const L 35 at 48-50. 
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of Justice, such that the role assumes a more non-partisan character;184 giving 
the Minister sponsoring the bill’s introduction responsibility for providing any 
justification analysis under section 1;185 establishing review by a parliamentary 
committee, similar to that in the United Kingdom;186 changing the reporting 
threshold to “serious probability” or something else less than the near certainty 
implied by the standard of “manifest unconstitutionality”;187 making public the 
policy manuals that establish the vetting process and threshold;188 and requiring 
production of a statement of compatibility or incompatibility, including an 
associated assessment, for every bill.189 It has been further suggested that the 
reporting requirement should be extended to private members’ bills; 190 that all 
reports should be made public;191 and that a report should be accompanied by 
a waiver of solicitor-client privilege for the underlying opinion as well as use of 
the notwithstanding clause if the government chooses to proceed.192 I would add 
to this list the possibilities of making reports that include substantive discussion 
of Charter concerns available to parliamentarians, but not the public, and a 
potentially more robust role for the lawyers housed within Parliament, either 
in the offices of the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel for the House of 
Commons and Senate or in the Library of Parliament.193
184. Roach, “Not Just the Government’s Lawyer,” supra note 38.
185. Kelly & Hennigar, supra note 183 at 50.
186. Hiebert, “Parliamentary Bills of Rights,” supra note 178 at 15.
187. Roach, “Not Just the Government’s Lawyer,” supra note 38.
188. Dodek, supra note 32 at 42-45. 
189. Kelly & Hennigar, supra note 183 at 50.
190. Roach, “Not Just the Government’s Lawyer,” supra note 38 at 624. 
191. Kelly, “Legislative Activism,” supra note 37 at 102. 
192. Roach, “Not Just the Government’s Lawyer,” supra note 38 at 631-632, 639-40. Section 33 
of the Canadian Charter allows a government to pass legislation “notwithstanding” the fact it 
violates one of the instrument’s substantive guarantees. A similar recommendation has been 
made in the New Zealand context. See Archer, supra note 182 at 320: 
There is clearly a public interest in the protection provided to communications between 
lawyers and their clients, but in the case where the Attorney-General presents a s 7 report to 
the government, the greater public interest is to be found in fostering open government and a 
transparent legislative process. Thus privilege protection should be overridden in this context.
 
193. The Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel, who reports to the Clerk of the House of 
Commons, provides legal counsel services to the Speaker of the House, the Board of 
Internal Economy, Members of the House of Commons, the Clerk, and other officials of 
the House of Commons’ administration. Additionally, the Law Clerk and Parliamentary 
Counsel provides legal and legislative counsel services to members and to House committees. 
See Board of Internal Economy, by-law, Governance and Administration By-Law, s 11, 
online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/House/BOIE/boie-ByLaw-
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There are undoubtedly other possible models worthy of exploration. The first 
step, however, must be recognition that the current system has failed. This article 
attempts to demonstrate the inevitability of this conclusion: While the significance 
of the lack of section 4.1 reports can be debated in the abstract, the absence 
of a notice of non-compliance when the Human Smugglers Act was introduced 
is indicative of a process that is failing to provide accountability. Further, this 
process is failing in the moments it is most needed: when the government 
chooses to introduce legislation for political benefit, notwithstanding the 
constitutional risks associated with doing so. We must recognize this failure 
and turn our collective minds to a remedy.
In the interim, we must also clarify the public record with respect to the 
nature of the section 4.1 vetting process so that it ceases to serve as a convenient 
form of political cover. The threshold on which bills are assessed should be overtly 
clarified and insisted upon so that the public is less easily misled by claims that 
review by government lawyers negates all Charter concerns. And we should all 
recall that internal vetting for bills that are manifestly unconstitutional is not a 
substitute for genuine and public constitutional debate. Even less so when the 
threshold being applied in that analysis fails to identify even the most egregious 
of violations, such as those that were introduced not once, but three times in the 
form of the Human Smugglers Act. 
AdministrationB-e.html>. The Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel to the Senate provides 
similar services in the Upper House. See Senate of Canada, “Clerk of the Senate and Clerk 
of the Parliaments,” online: Parliament of Canada <http://sen.parl.gc.ca/portal/clerk-e.htm>. 
The Library of Parliament also provides research and analysis services to parliamentarians 
and their staff on a variety of topics, including legal issues. See e.g. “Library of Parliament 
Research Publications” (2012), online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/
Library/VirtualLibrary/ResearchPublicationsCurrent-e.asp>. 

